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expectations to select an action to achieve a desired outcome. Often, this process requires working
memory to hold and manipulate the relevant information. Working memory has several known limitations
and models of implementation that have not been widely considered in the context of decision-making.
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this activity might be leveraged to implement several computational elements of decision making, we
performed two related experiments.In the first, we had human participants perform a working memory
task that required the reporting of a decision variable (average location) to determine how working
memory limitations impacted decision precision. We also used models of working memory to predict and
interpret what information was being actively maintained. We report not only the novel finding that
decision variables held in working memory lose precision over time but also that the degree of precision
loss depends on the strategy used to make the decision, which differed across participants and
conditions. In our second study, we trained monkeys to perform an adaptive oculomotor delayed
response task in which they had to integrate cue information with context to select the target most likely
to be rewarded. The goal of this study was to investigate whether the tuning properties of workingmemory related dlPFC neurons adjusted according to the statistics of the task, corresponding to adaptive
behavior. We found that not all monkeys display adaptive behavior, but developed method for
interrogating the dynamics of neural responses in those that do. This body of work contributes to our
understanding of how working memory may implement the representation of a decision variable or prior
information used to interpret incoming evidence. Such understanding may ultimately lead to more
effective approaches to addressing disorders of maladaptive decisions, such as addiction and PTSD.
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ABSTRACT
THE ROLE OF WORKING MEMORY IN IMPLEMENTING COMPUTATIONAL
ELEMENTS OF VISUO-SPATIAL DECISION-MAKING
Kyra Schapiro
Joshua I. Gold
Decision making is a dynamic process by which a person integrates sensory
evidence with prior expectations to select an action to achieve a desired outcome. Often,
this process requires working memory to hold and manipulate the relevant information.
Working memory has several known limitations and models of implementation that have
not been widely considered in the context of decision-making. For decisions regarding
spatial stimuli, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) is likely to be essential. Activity
in this area has been shown to relate to both decision making and working memory, and
has led to concrete models of how spatial information may be stored by population activity.
To investigate how this activity might be leveraged to implement several computational
elements of decision making, we performed two related experiments.
In the first, we had human participants perform a working memory task that
required the reporting of a decision variable (average location) to determine how working
memory limitations impacted decision precision. We also used models of working memory
to predict and interpret what information was being actively maintained. We report not
only the novel finding that decision variables held in working memory lose precision over
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time but also that the degree of precision loss depends on the strategy used to make the
decision, which differed across participants and conditions.
In our second study, we trained monkeys to perform an adaptive oculomotor
delayed response task in which they had to integrate cue information with context to select
the target most likely to be rewarded. The goal of this study was to investigate whether the
tuning properties of working-memory related dlPFC neurons adjusted according to the
statistics of the task, corresponding to adaptive behavior. We found that not all monkeys
display adaptive behavior, but developed method for interrogating the dynamics of neural
responses in those that do.
This body of work contributes to our understanding of how working memory may
implement the representation of a decision variable or prior information used to interpret
incoming evidence. Such understanding may ultimately lead to more effective approaches
to addressing disorders of maladaptive decisions, such as addiction and PTSD.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Prudent decision-making is a dynamic process that requires the considered
integration of various pieces of evidence and the context into a cohesive choice. For
example, when someone is considering what clothes to pack a trip, she may integrate the
weather reports of the last several days at her destination to get an idea of what apparel is
appropriate. Let us also suppose that this person is traveling to Boston and can only bring
a carry-on bag. If the past week has reported a 50°F day, then whether she interprets this
experience as an indication to leave her down jacket will depend on the context of season.
The identical experience of a 50°F day would be an anomaly in mid-winter to be ignored,
but a sign that the heavy jacket may not be necessary in early spring. Our brains must not
only represent abstract, accumulated expectations based on multiple experiences, but also
use context to appropriately interpret new experiences to make optimal decisions. While
both of these decision-making aspects require the use of working memory in some fashion
to store and manipulate information, the limitations of working memory have not been
largely considered in the context of decision making.
This introduction will review the framework for optimal decision-making and
address how the dynamic nature of decision-making necessitates the consideration of the
constraints potentially imposed by working memory. I also discuss how the properties of
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) may be leveraged to implement several working
memory dependent aspects of decision making, particularly with regards to spatial
decisions.
1

Components of a Decision
Many decisions, particularly perceptual ones, can be thought of as a solution to the
problem “what is true based on what is experienced?” While this process may seem
relatively trivial, in reality it has several components. Organisms can only experience
reality through their sensory systems, which in turn may only have noisy representations
of the world from which to draw conclusions. This problem of forming conclusions based
on incomplete or noisy evidence has been acknowledged by philosophers since ancient
Greek times, as typified by Plato’s Allegory of the Cave (Ferguson, 1922). As such, it is
useful to break down the process into the different components going into a decision (Gold
& Shadlen, 2007).
The most obvious component of a decision is evidence (e). Evidence is the
experience of the world, for example, the temperature of a given day. However, evidence
is often noisy: without a thermometer, one can’t precisely tell the temperature. Evidence is
only meaningful so long as it bears relevance to an action: for example, whether or not one
will want a jacket. In this example, the decision breaks down into alternative hypotheses
(h): will I want a jacket today or not? In choosing between the two options, one considers
the likelihood of the evidence (the temperature) given the two possibilities (wanting a
jacket or not) (P(e|hn)). The likelihood that you will experience 80°F (evidence) given that
you will truly want a jacket is quite low; thus, it is the likelihood that bears the most
influence on the decision, rather than the raw evidence. A second component of a decision
that is often overlooked is the probability that a given hypothesis is true (the prior, P(hn)).
2

The prior allows weighting of the evidence to best account for any information already
known. For example, in mid-winter, the prior that one will want a jacket is quite high
regardless of whether the external temperature has actually been yet experienced. The prior
can either be instructed or inferred from experience, but in either case is separate from a
single experience of sensory evidence. The evidence/likelihood and prior must then be
combined into a decision variable that describes which of the options is favored. Unlike a
choice (wearing a jacket or not), the decision variable is an analog quantity (how much do
I think I should be wearing a jacket).
A formalism that describes this process of combining evidence and prior into a
decision variable is Signal Detection Theory (SDT) (Green & Swets, 1966). Under this
formalism, the decision maker chooses the most likely hypothesis given the evidence
(posterior probabilities, P(hn |e)). In order to do so, one compares the posterior probabilities
of the options. If there are two options, then this decision variable is the ratio of the
posteriors

𝑃(ℎ 1 | 𝑒)
𝑃(ℎ 2 | 𝑒)

. If this ratio is greater than 1, the evidence favors h1 and if not then the

evidence favors h2. According to Bayes’ Rule, the posterior probability, P(hn | e), is the
likelihood of the evidence given the hypothesis, P(e|hn), times the prior, P(hn), divided by
the probability of the evidence P(e). As such, the decision variable becomes

𝑃(𝑒|ℎ1 )∗𝑃(ℎ1 )
𝑃(𝑒|ℎ2 )∗𝑃(ℎ2 )

,

a combination of likelihoods and priors.
So far, the decision variable formulation has only established what to do with a
single piece of evidence. Often, particularly when the evidence is noisy or unreliable, it is
3

prudent to gather as much evidence as possible and combine the pieces when deciding. If
one considers all the evidence to be independently sampled from the true state of the world,
then the likelihood ratio of observing all n pieces of evidence becomes
𝑃(𝑒1 |ℎ1 )∗𝑃(𝑒2 |ℎ1 )∗…𝑃(𝑒𝑛 |ℎ1 )
.
𝑃(𝑒1 |ℎ2 )∗𝑃(𝑒2 |ℎ2 )∗…𝑃(𝑛|ℎ2 )

∑𝑛𝑖=1 log

𝑃(𝑒𝑖 |ℎ1 )
.
𝑃(𝑒𝑖 |ℎ2 )

Taking the log of this value allows the product to become a sum:

As such, the log decision variable in a case with multiple pieces of

evidence can be thought of as the sum of the log likelihood ratios of the evidence and the
log ratio of the priors. Thus, with any additional piece of evidence, the decision variable
can be updated by adding the log likelihood ratio of the new evidence in what is termed
Sequential Analysis. This extension of SDT is the base form of the sequential probability
ratio test (Wald & Wolfowitz, 1947).
Much work has been done in terms of exploring the neural implementations of each
element of the decision-making process. For example, directional evidence from random
dot motion is known to be represented by neural activity in the middle temporal area (MT)
and thought to be integrated into a decision variable by activity in the lateral intraparietal
area (LIP) (for review see Gold & Shadlen, 2007). However, little work has been done on
the representation of a prior, which by definition exists as a modifier to sensory evidence
and therefore must be mentally accessible during the potentially prolonged time of
evidence accumulation. Additionally, during Sequential Analysis, the decision variable
must be held in working memory and updated as new pieces of sensory evidence are added.
As such, both the prior and the decision variable interact with working memory, though

4

the effects of this interaction have largely been ignored. Working memory has its own
constraints which may affect the utility of the ultimate decision as well as dictate the neural
implementation of both these decision elements.
Working memory and the implications of its constraints to decision-making
Working memory is a system of temporary information storage and manipulation
that has a long history in the field of psychology. Originally, it was conceptualized as a
system composed of a “central executive”, a “phonological loop”, and a “visuospatial
sketch pad” (review: Baddeley, 2003). Within this model, the latter two systems held on
to auditory and visual information respectively, while the central executive manipulated
information found in storage. Early studies of working memory focused on item limits,
contending that the number of items that could be held was fixed, with estimates ranging
from four (Cowan, 2001) to seven plus/minus two items (G. A. Miller, 1956). Overall,
working memory was considered to have a set number of ‘slots’; when attempting to
remember, an object was loaded into a working memory slot and remembered accurately
or was completely forgotten (Luck & Vogel, 1997).
However, the past 15 years have provided evidence that has increasingly moved
thinking away from the strict ‘slots’ model in favor of various forms of ‘resource’ models.
Within this set of models, memory is a limited resource that is distributed amongst
memoranda. Under these models, there is no fixed item limit per se, so much as a limit to
the total precision with which an item/s can be remembered (Ma et al., 2014). As such,

5

when more items need to be remembered, each item is allocated fewer resources of the
total and is thus remembered with less precision. This hypothesis has been supported by
experiments in which one or more stimuli are presented briefly, followed by a short delay,
after which a feature (such as location, color, orientation) is probed from one of the items
(e.g. Gorgoraptis et al., 2011). Behaviorally, multiple studies have shown that the precision
of recall and set size are related by a power law (Bays et al., 2009; Gorgoraptis et al., 2011;
Van Den Berg et al., 2012). Such a view is inconsistent with the pure slots model, which
does not predict a decrease in recall precision with more items, but rather predicts an
increased probability of total forgetting. Additionally supporting the view of a shared
resource model is the finding that when subjects are cued that one item is more likely to be
probed than the others, the precision of reports for that item is increased relative to an equal
probability item while the precision of reports of non-cued items is decreased (Bays &
Husain, 2008; Gorgoraptis et al., 2011).
While it is not a fixed limit, it is clear that increasing the number of items in memory
decreases the precision with which each is remembered. Additionally, it is known that the
longer a single item is held in working memory, the more variable the recall (Barrouillet et
al., 2012; McKeown & Mercer, 2012; Ploner et al., 1998; White et al., 1994; Zhang &
Luck, 2008, 2009). Therefore, both time and item number affect the precision of how an
item is remembered. However, how these two factors interact is a matter of debate, with
some studies indicating that they are relatively independent (Shin et al., 2017), some
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indicating that they interact (Koyluoglu et al., 2017), and still others finding evidence for
both possibilities (Schneegans & Bays, 2018).
Given these two factors of time and capacity known to affect working memory,
there are some clear questions that arise regarding how these limitations affect the various
elements of decision making. As stated above, the decision variable is often considered a
sum of multiple pieces of evidence. However, it is entirely unclear when and how these
pieces of evidence are combined. As such, the working memory set size limitations may
affect the precision of the representations of evidence that are combined into the decision
variable if the individual pieces need maintenance. When the decision is not made
immediately or when pieces of evidence are presented sequentially, the temporal
limitations of working memory may affect precision of the decision as well. The issue of
possible decision variable formation and/or storage in working memory is further
confounded by the findings that suggest that rather than storing individual items in working
memory, items are automatically chunked (Nassar et al., 2018) and/or a gist is stored from
which individual items are inferred (Brady & Tenenbaum, 2013). Additionally, the prior
must also somehow be represented in working memory but work on how exactly nonstimulus information, such as the decision variable or prior, is stored is lacking. In order to
understand how abstracted quantities such as the decision variable and prior might be
stored and utilized in working memory, one must consider what is known about the
neurobiology of working memory and decision making and what properties might support
these abstractions.
7

Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex’s role in working memory and decision making
One region that has been associated with both working memory and decision
making is the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). The dlPFC consists of the gyrus of
the dorsal bank of the principal sulcus in macaques and Brodmann’s Area 46 and 9 in
humans (Szczepanski & Knight, 2014). Broadly speaking, this area is thought to regulate
actions driven by internal representations, rather than actions driven by external stimuli,
such as recognition tasks (Patricia S. Goldman-Rakic, 1987). Anatomically, the dlPFC has
several connections that likely contribute to this function (Patricia S. Goldman-Rakic,
1987). One region with which the dlPFC shares reciprocal connections is the posterior
parietal cortex. This area processes visual stimuli and is thus able to transmit data about
the world to the dlPFC. Additionally, the dlPFC contains reciprocal connection from the
parahippocampal gyrus, an area associated with long-term storage, which would allow the
dlPFC to access relevant old information and to archive new findings. dlPFC is also
connected to motor and reward-learning areas such as the basal ganglia, allowing any
actions based upon dlPFC content to be executed.
Lesion studies have also shown the dlPFC’s role in working memory tasks,
particularly those of a spatial nature (Szczepanski & Knight, 2014). As far back as 1935, it
was found that monkeys with damage in this area had difficulty with tasks involving
response to a recently removed stimulus (Jacobsen, 1935). Goldman-Rakic refined these
findings, showing that the spatial processing ability of monkeys with such lesions were
selectively impacted. Her study demonstrated that such monkeys were able to perform
8

visuospatial tasks when the relevant information remained visible, but not when there was
an intratrial delay between instruction and action, isolating working memory as the dlPFCdependent deficit (Goldman et al., 1971; Goldman & Rosvold, 1970). Furthermore, this
deficit became more pronounced the longer the delay (S. Funahashi et al., 1993; Fuster,
2008). Temporary inactivation of dlPFC, but not other, sensory-related areas, was also
found to impair performance in working memory task by increasing attention to intra-task
distractors (Suzuki & Gottlieb, 2013).
Human lesion studies also support the role of the dlPFC in working memory,
although whether the role is one of maintenance or manipulation is less clear. Several
studies have shown that humans with dlPFC damage have impaired performance in N-back
tests (Barbey et al., 2013). In such tasks, participants are shown a series of items and
instructed to report whether an item is novel or repeated. The larger the N-back, the more
difficult it is to remember an individual item and the more likely a repeated item will be
reported as novel. People with dlPFC lesions were only able to correctly identify when a
letter had been shown two items earlier in the sequence half the time of healthy control
subjects (Tsuchida & Fellows, 2009), implying a lack of ability to keep the sequence in
mind. Humans with dlPFC lesions are also unable to perform a task where they must select
an item from a set and repeat selecting until every item has been chosen exactly once
(Petrides & Milner, 1982).

9

Studies utilizing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and transcranial
magnetic stimulation (TMS) have also found evidence for the involvement of the dlPFC in
working memory. For example, TMS that disrupted dlPFC activity resulted in more errors
in a 3-back letter test than for controls (Christophe et al., 2012). In another study, when
subjects were shown 1-3 items (faces or spatial locations) for three seconds before a delay
period of 15 or 24 seconds, fMRI revealed sustained activation in the prefrontal cortex,
particularly Brodmann’s area 46/9 (Jha & McCarthy, 2000; Leung et al., 2002).
Additionally, the magnitude of this increased activation during the delay predicted task
performance (Pessoa et al., 2002). However, the magnitude of this delayed activity increase
has been shown to have an inconsistent relationship with memory load, such that the
activity has sometimes been shown to increase with more items (Leung et al., 2002; A. B.
Rypma et al., 2002) and sometimes not (Jha & McCarthy, 2000; B. Rypma & D’Esposito,
1999). Some have argued that the lack of consistent effect of working memory load on
fMRI-based measures of dlPFC activity is evidence that dlPFC activity is not involved in
storage of memoranda as much as manipulation and attention to items (Curtis &
D’Esposito, 2003). However, under the resource model of working memory, the overall
amount of activity might not be expected to change with working memory item load,
consistent with the finding that activity level does not always relate to load size.
Some studies have suggested that the dlPFC activity is more related to selecting the
action relevant to reporting a memorandum, rather than a memorandum itself. One such
study had subjects either remember an array of locations for 18 seconds before reporting
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their memory of a probed item or had subjects make a movement to a displayed target after
a delay. The authors found similar dlPFC activity during the delay regardless of whether
the context involved remembered items or only a response; however, they found increased
activity in the dlPFC during the response period only during the memory array context
(Rowe et al., 2000). Other studies have suggested that more posterior regions are involved
in the storage of the memoranda themselves as lesions that affect the precentral sulcus but
spared dlPFC were responsible for working memory impairments (Mackey et al., 2016).
Also, multivariate pattern classification was able to decode memory content from activity
in the posterior parietal cortex and visual areas, but not the dlPFC (Christophe et al., 2012).
According to another study, dlPFC activity seemed more consistent with a role in
preventing distractors from affecting working memory representation of task relevant items
(Suzuki & Gottlieb, 2013). Overall, it seems clear that, in humans, the dlPFC is involved
in working memory tasks, though whether or not it encodes the representation of
memoranda is still under debate.
In addition to its role in working memory, the dlPFC seems to be related to decision
making, particularly decisions involving the integration of evidence over time
(Barraclough et al., 2004; Hauke R. Heekeren et al., 2008; Histed et al., 2009; Seo et al.,
2007; X. J. Wang, 2008). One early example of a study revealing this involvement utilized
a random dot motion integration task. The study found that as more motion evidence was
presented, the neural responses in the dlPFC predicted the monkey’s subsequent choice of
the net direction of motion and reflected the strength of the evidence. As such the region
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represented both sensory integration and motor signals, the two components necessary to
constitute a decision (Kim & Shadlen, 1999). In another study monkeys were trained to
perform a decision-making task in which they were presented with a sequence of objects.
Each object was associated with a probability that one of the two targets the monkey had
to choose from would be correct. In order to optimally decide, the monkeys had to combine
evidence of which target was going to be rewarded across all the presented objects. The
scientists found that activity in the dlPFC tracked the multi-cue combined reward
probability as well as evidence of stimulus-to-action transformation (Lin et al., 2020).
Therefore, single unit monkey studies have found that the dlPFC seems involved in
integrating evidence into a decision across multiple evidence types.
Human studies also indicate an involvement of the dlPFC in decision making. In a
fMRI study where human subjects had to determine whether the morphed image they
viewed was originally a face or a house, it was found that activity in the left dlPFC was
greater during less morphed (and therefore easier) images than for highly morphed images
and predicted the subjects’ choices (H. R. Heekeren et al., 2004). Such activity difference
is consistent with the representation of a decision variable that is stronger for more certain
choices than less certain ones. A follow up study combined the monkey random dot motion
discrimination task of Kim and Shadlen, 1999 with human fMRI and again found the
stronger dlPFC response for easy over hard choices. Furthermore, this neural response held
true regardless of whether subjects responded using a button press or eye movement (H. R.
Heekeren et al., 2006). This response modality independence demonstrates that the
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dlPFC’s activity is not merely a reflection of upcoming motor responses and therefore more
likely to be a true reflection of the abstract decision variable, something that could not be
disambiguated from the original monkey study. Additionally, a human study revealed a
causal, rather than correlational, relationship between the dlPFC and decision making. The
authors used repeated TMS to disrupt dlPFC activity in human subjects performing a
reaction time house-vs-face task. They found the disruption of dlPFC activity resulted in
reduced accuracy and increased response time, consistent with a decrease in the rate of
evidence accumulation (Philiastides et al., 2011).
Overall, there is a plethora of evidence that the dlPFC is involved in higher
cognitive processes, particularly working memory and decision making of various forms.
Cellular basis and models of the role of the dlPFC in working memory
Given that there are many forms of both working memory and decision making,
understanding even a modicum of the neural representation of decision-making elements
recommends the selection of an exemplar from which general principals might be deduced.
A prime candidate for closer examination is that of spatial memory and decision-making
due to the highly controllable and universally salient nature of spatial stimuli. Specifically,
there is evidence for a concrete framework of activity that represents spatial stimuli in
working memory that might be leveraged to represent decision elements like the decision
variable and prior.
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Electrophysiological studies in monkeys have provided strong evidence that
neurons in the dlPFC have the properties necessary to support spatial working memory
representations. The classical studies showing these properties had monkeys perform an
oculomotor delayed response tasks in which the monkey viewed a brief cue and
remembered the cue location so as to make a response to that location after a delay.
Recordings in dlPFC neurons found cells which exhibited a significant and persistent
change in activity (either excitation or inhibition depending upon the cell) during the delay
period, but only when the cue was located within a specific spatial area (Shintaro Funahashi
et al., 1989). Typically, the area to which a cell selectively responded was in the
contralateral visual field (A. F. T. Arnsten, 2013; Shintaro Funahashi et al., 1989). As these
neurons responded to the visual stimulus and maintained their responses once the cue was
removed, they seem to represent the stimulus to bridge the intervening memory delay: i.e.
working memory. Such properties were seen in 87 of the 288 recorded cells (Shintaro
Funahashi et al., 1989).
In addition to selectively responding when the memorandum is in a specific spatial
location (i.e. being tuned to a specific location), these neurons have two important
properties necessary to be considered a working memory representation. Importantly, the
direction to which the neuron is tuned has been shown to remain stable over multiple days,
a property necessary for the activity to be considered a veridical representation of a specific
spatial memorandum (A. F. T. Arnsten, 2013). Also, this persistent activity is resistant to
the presentation of a distractor in the middle of the delay (E. K. Miller et al., 1996; Suzuki
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& Gottlieb, 2013). More tellingly, the degree to which the dlPFC activity successfully
suppressed responses to distractors correlated with task performance, and inactivation of
the dlPFC specifically increased distractibility (Suzuki & Gottlieb, 2013). This resistance
to distractors by the dlPFC is in contrast to more posterior regions of the brain that also
maintain representation of relevant memoranda but also display activity correlated with
distractors (and thus are more likely to be sensory rather than memory regions) (E. K.
Miller et al., 1996; Suzuki & Gottlieb, 2013).
The microcircuitry that generates such persistent activity in the absence of
continuing stimuli has been examined in a series of experiments (P. S. Goldman-Rakic,
1995). Using retrograde tracers injected into specific layers of dlPFC, Kritzer and
Goldman-Rakic found that neurons of layer IIIc had extensive horizontal connections with
each other extending 2-7mm (Kritzer & Goldman-Rakic, 1995). Recording from multiple
nearby neurons revealed they had similar preferred directions and activity timing consistent
with monosynaptic excitatory connections (Constantinidis et al., 2001). Additional studies
revealed that the persistent firing after the cessation of the memory cue depends on slow,
excitatory glutamatergic stimulation of NMDA receptors (M. Wang et al., 2013). Further
studies revealed that the spatial tuning of the neurons depended on lateral inhibition onto
excitatory pyramidal cells by GABAergic interneurons (A. F. T. Arnsten, 2013;
Constantinidis et al., 2001; M. Wang et al., 2013). Specifically, simultaneous recordings
of presumed excitatory pyramidal and GABAergic interneurons with opposed tuning
showed that when the GABAergic neuron tuned to 270° fired, the pyramidal cell tuned to
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90° was suppressed (A. F. T. Arnsten, 2013). Thus, not only do similarly tuned neurons
excite each other, but oppositely tuned neurons suppress each other to maintain tight
control of representational specificity. This conclusion is further supported by the finding
that the spatial tuning of the persistent firing of dlPFC cells is degraded by the application
of GABA antagonists (Rao et al., 2000).
These pieces of anatomical and physiological data have been combined into a
family of cohesive, computational, and mechanistic models of the cellular basis of working
memory (Compte, 2000). The models state that similarly tuned excitatory neurons are
synaptically connected in such a way that they may sustain activity in each other in the
absence of continuing visual input; based on the proximity of similarly tuned neurons, such
activity typifies local excitation. Additionally, inhibitory cells display more diffuse
connections to cells of opposite tuning, in what is termed lateral inhibition. Together the
local excitation ensures that neurons tuned to the visual stimulus continue to excite each
other while lateral inhibition suppresses activity on neurons tuned to irrelevant directions.
This architecture creates a ‘bump’ of activity that represents the memorandum and gives
name to the class of ‘bump attractor’ models. The exact details of the proposed neuronal
connections vary from formulation to formulation. For example, the classic model assumes
similar responses to the preferred stimuli of each neuron (Compte, 2000), but physiological
data shows a variety of response profiles (Shintaro Funahashi et al., 1989). This
heterogeneity of responses is accounted for in some more complex models like that of
Renart et al., 2003.
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These models have successfully described and predicted several experimental
findings. Despite the variety of response types in the population, population delay period
dlPFC activity has been able to be represented by, stable, low dimensional population codes
(Murray et al., 2017; Wolff et al., 2020). Additionally, bump attractor models predict that
errors in working memory reports naturally stem from stochasticity in neural activity. This
stochasticity causes the center of the activity bump that represents the memorandum to
diffuse to adjacently tuned neurons, thus shifting the representation slightly off the
veridical item. As such, these models predict that when a behavioral report of a spatial
memorandum is clockwise to the true stimulus, then neurons tuned to stimuli clockwise of
the true stimulus should have a higher-than-average activity (Ben-Yishai et al., 1995; Wu
et al., 2008). This correlational prediction, termed a tuning curve bias, was validated in
subsequent electrophysiological recordings that found exactly this pattern (Wimmer et al.,
2014). Additionally, the tuning curve bias only appeared towards the end of the delay;
activity patterns earlier in the delay seem to reflect diffusion of the representation but are
independent of the ultimate location of the memory representation and thus response
(Wimmer et al., 2014).
Bump attractor models have also been extended to explain the representation of
multiple memoranda at once. Generally speaking, these models implement the shared
resources conceptual model of working memory by capping the total amount of activity
within the network (Wei et al., 2012). When multiple items need to be represented, a
normalization occurs, and each is only allocated a subset of the total activity. Thus, instead
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of having one large, stable bump of activity representing a single item, these models
employ multiple smaller bumps. Because each of these bumps is not as continuously
reinforced compared to a single bump, these have a greater propensity to diffuse or even
collapse, predicting the increase in memory errors associated with larger set sizes
(Krishnan et al., 2018; Wei et al., 2012).
Possible implementation of decision variables and priors by bump attractors
Given the established connection between working memory and decision making,
it is natural to question how the bump attractor model of working memory representation
and its implications interact with the elements of decision making. The majority of bump
attractor models of working memory represent only presented stimuli and do not consider
manipulations of this information such as occurs in decision-making (Almeida et al., 2015;
Brady & Alvarez, 2015; Wei et al., 2012). It is entirely plausible that when a decision is
temporally removed from the evidence used to calculate the decision, each piece of
evidence is maintained in working memory in its own bump and later combined by some
process. Alternatively, it is possible that the decision is calculated immediately, and this
abstract value is stored as a bump in the network. One variation of the bump attractor model
allows for the network itself to calculate a running average value of sequentially presented
items, with tuning properties of the network determining the weight given to early or late
pieces of evidence (Esnaola-Acebes et al., 2021). Alternatively, some other neural process
could compute the decision variable and feed it into the working memory network in much
the same way that visual information is fed in. This hypothesis is more consistent with the
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‘chunking’ hypothesis of working memory, in which similar items are remembered as a
gestalt rather than individually (Brady & Alvarez, 2015; Nassar et al., 2018). Which of
these two, or other, representational implementations of the decision variable is employed
by the brain is currently unknown.
How the working memory system might represent priors is also speculative. One
possibility is that contextual regularities cause a bias in the diffusion of working memory
representations. Rather than randomly diffuse around the true memorandum, if one item
appears more frequently than others, one might expect the neural representation to be
biased towards that more common item. Such dynamics have been computationally
observed in behavior from both humans and non-human primates (Panichello et al., 2019).
Furthermore, the bias has been demonstrated to be modulable, such that if the statistical
regularities change, the bias in behavior and potential representational drift changes with
them (Panichello et al., 2019).
The way in which such a bias could be mechanistically implemented is suggested
by the relationship between working memory, neuromodulation, and priors. Working
memory has been shown to be affected by multiple neuromodulators, but of particular
interest is the relationship between norepinephrine and working memory (Amy F.T.
Arnsten, 2000; Clark & Noudoost, 2014). It has been shown that the dlPFC has a higherthan-average concentration of high-affinity α2A-adrenoreceptors (α2A) (Amy F.T.
Arnsten, 2000). Activation of this receptor by an agonist has been shown to selectively
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increase working memory performance in rats (Franowicz et al., 2002), monkeys (A. F.T.
Arnsten et al., 1988), and humans (Jäkälä et al., 1999). Furthermore, application of this
α2A agonist increases the firing rate of persistent activity of dlPFC neurons to the preferred
direction but not to the non-preferred direction (A. F.T. Arnsten et al., 1988; Ji et al., 2008;
M. Wang et al., 2007). Such a selective increase in the response to the preferred direction
can be thought of as sharpening the degree to which a given neuron is representing a
direction. Conversely, application of the lower-affinity α1A agonist decreases working
memory performance and decreases the selectivity of delay period activity in the dlPFC
(Amy F.T. Arnsten, 2000; Mao et al., 1999; M. Wang et al., 2007). Since both receptors
respond to norepinephrine but α2A has higher affinity, at low levels of norepinephrine,
α2A binding will dominate and working memory maybe enhanced, whereas at high levels
of norepinephrine α1A will be activated, decreasing working memory.
This pattern of norepinephrine levels and performance change seems to relate to
findings suggesting a relationship between norepinephrine levels and the effects of priors
in dynamic environments. When an environment is stable, the prior is highly relevant (i.e.
important to prudent decision making), and baseline pupil dilation has been found to be
decreased compared to periods of instability (Krishnamurthy et al., 2017; Nassar et al.,
2012). Decreased baseline pupil has been found to correlate with decreased levels of locus
coeruleus (LC) activity (Joshi et al., 2016). The locus coeruleus is the primary source of
cortical norephinephrine and has extensive projections to the dlPFC (Aston-Jones &
Cohen, 2005). Therefore, when the prior is important for decision making, there is
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decreased baseline pupils, which suggest a decreased level of LC activity, which in turn
suggests decreased levels of norephinephrine and a higher ratio of α2A to α1A activation,
and thus stronger memory representations. Conversely, it has been shown that immediately
after a period of environmental change, there is an increase in evoked pupil activity
(Krishnamurthy et al., 2017; Nassar et al., 2012), which has been found to correlate with
increased LC activity (Joshi et al., 2016). This pattern suggests that when a prior is no
longer relevant such as after a change point, norepinephrine levels might increase, leading
to a decreased ratio of α2A to α1A activation, resulting in less specificity in memory
representation. Together, this evidence suggests that when the prior is relevant to decision
making, a bias in the drift of the memory-representing bump of activity may be shifted
towards the representation of the more common stimulus by selective strengthening of the
responses of the common stimulus-representing neurons by lowered levels of
norepinephrine. Conversely, such biases might be reset by elevated levels of
norepinephrine reducing the enhanced response. A signature of such a bias in the neural
representations might be demonstrated by enhanced delay period responses of dlPFC
neurons when the preferred stimulus is more likely to be relevant than when it is less likely
to be relevant. Such increased activity would reflect a drift of the memory-representing
bump towards the more common stimulus and could allow the differential transformation
of evidence into a decision under different contexts.
My thesis attempts to address the questions of how the brain represents abstract
decision variables over time as well as how environmental expectations of stability (priors)
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can affect the representation and transformation of evidence into a decision within working
memory. In Chapter 2, I present my findings on how time and set size affect the precision
of a memory for a calculated decision value in humans. I continue in Chapter 3 to discuss
my investigations on how different environmental contexts affected dlPFC representation
of evidence used to make decisions by non-human primates.
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Introduction
Many perceptual, memory-based, and reward-based decisions depend on an
accumulation of evidence over time (Brody & Hanks, 2016; Gold & Shadlen, 2007;
Ratcliff et al., 2016; Shadlen & Shohamy, 2016; Summerfield & Tsetsos, 2012). This
dynamic process, which can operate on timescales ranging from tens to hundreds of
milliseconds for many perceptual decisions to seconds or longer for reward-based and other
decisions (Bernacchia et al., 2011; Gold & Stocker, 2017), requires working memory to
maintain representations of new, incoming evidence and/or the aggregated, updating
decision variable. Working memory is constrained by capacity and temporal limitations
(Bastos et al., 2018; Cowan et al., 2008; Funahashi et al., 1989; Oberauer et al., 2016;
Panichello et al., 2019; Ploner et al., 1998; Schneegans & Bays, 2018; White et al., 1994)
that, in principle, could also constrain decision performance. Several previous studies
failed to identify such constraints on decisions that depend on working memory, but those
studies used tasks involving binary choices that may be relatively insensitive to known
working-memory limitations (Liu et al., 2015; Waskom & Kiani, 2018). It remains unclear
if and how working-memory limitations affect decisions that require interpreting and
storing continuously valued quantities whose representations are known to degrade over
time (Ploner et al., 1998; Schneegans & Bays, 2018; Wei et al., 2012; White et al., 1994).
To better understand how working-memory limitations affect decision-making, we
examined how humans made decisions that required interpreting and storing continuously
valued visuo-spatial information (visual target locations) that is sensitive to capacity and
temporal limitations of working memory (Bastos et al., 2018; Funahashi et al., 1989;
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Panichello et al., 2019; Ploner et al., 1998; Schneegans & Bays, 2018; White et al., 1994).
Specifically, we required participants to indicate a remembered spatial location that was
informed by one or more briefly presented visual stimuli (“disks”; Fig.2.1) after a variable
delay. We compared the effects of variable set size and delay when the remembered
location corresponded to either: 1) the perceived location (angle) of a specific disk,
identified at the time of interrogation, which is a design that has been used previously
(Ploner et al., 1998; Schneegans & Bays, 2018; Wei et al., 2012; White et al., 1994); or 2)
the computed mean angle of a set of multiple disks, which is a form of continuous decision
variable whose sensitivity to working-memory limitations has not been examined in detail.
Additionally, we examined the effects of working-memory limitations on computed
locations under two conditions that are representative of certain decision-making tasks.
The first was a “simultaneous” condition in which all disks (and thus all information) were
presented at once. The second was a “sequential” condition in which one disk was
presented later than the others. This condition required participants to adjust to a withintrial change of available decision-relevant information, typifying decisions that require
evidence accumulation over time.
For spatial working-memory tasks, the precision of working memory for perceived
spatial locations is often well described by diffusion dynamics (Compte, 2000; Kilpatrick,
2018; Kilpatrick et al., 2013; Laing & Chow, 2001) that are commonly implemented in
“bump-attractor” models of working memory (Compte, 2000; Constantinidis et al., 2018;
Laing & Chow, 2001; Riley & Constantinidis, 2015; Wei et al., 2012; Wimmer et al.,
2014). Our analyses built on this framework by examining memory diffusion dynamics for
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Figure 2.1: Behavioral task. Participants were asked to maintain visual fixation on the center
cross while an array of colored disks was presented for 0.5 s, followed by a variable delay and
finally the presentation of a visual cue whose color was either: 1) the same as one of the disks,
indicating that the participant should use the mouse to mark the remembered location of that
disk (“Perceptual” trial) or 2) white, indicating that the participant should mark the mean angle
of the array (“Computed” trial). Perceptual and Computed trials were presented in separate,
signaled blocks. On Perceptual trials, participants did not know in advance which disk would
be probed on any given trial. The number of disks and length of the delay period were varied
randomly within each block. Blocks were also defined by the temporal presentation of the disks.
In “Simultaneous” blocks, all disks were presented at once, whereas in “Sequential” blocks, the
final disk (always the most counterclockwise of all disks presented on that trial) was presented
midway through the variable delay. In all blocks, the disks always had the same clockwise
ordering by color, as depicted in the “memory array” graphic above, to minimize binding errors
between color and location in the Perceived blocks.
Figure 2.1: Behavioral task

the different task conditions and potential decision strategies. For the conditions we tested,
most participants behavior was well fit by one of two distinct strategies, each with its own
constraints on decision performance based on different working-memory demands. The
first strategy was to compute the decision variable (mean disk angle) immediately upon
observing the evidence (individual disk angles), and then store that value in working
memory in a manner that, like for the memory of a single perceived angle, could be
modeled as a single particle with a particular diffusion constant (Average-then-Diffuse

41

model; AtD). The second strategy was to maintain representations of all disk locations in
working memory, modeled as separate diffusing particles, and then to combine them into
a decision variable only at the time of the decision (Diffuse-then-Average model; DtA).
Such a strategy results in an effective diffusion constant for the average that is inversely
related to the number of items. Our results show that like perceived locations, memory for
computed mean locations degraded with increased set size (of relevant information) and
delay between presentation and report. However, the degree of degradation depended on
the strategy used to compute the decision variables, implying that multiple, strategy- and
task-dependent effects of working-memory should be considered in the construction of
future neural and computational models of decision-making.
Results
We measured the ability of human participants to remember spatial angles as a
function of set size (1, 2, or 5 disks), delay duration (0, 1, or 6 s), and task context
(Perceived or Computed blocks). Specifically, we measured the error between reported and
probed angles as a proxy for working memory-representations and inferred rates of
memory degradation (diffusion constants) from the increase in variance of these errors over
time within a framework of diffusing-particle models. Below we first describe the model
framework, detailing its key assumptions and predictions. We next describe results from
Simultaneous conditions, in which all items were presented simultaneously at the
beginning of each trial, which demonstrate how capacity and temporal constraints on
working memory relate to the accuracy of computed decision variables. We then describe
results from Sequential conditions, in which one item was presented after the others in each
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trial, which demonstrate how capacity and temporal constraints affect the process of
evidence integration over time.
Diffusing-Particle Framework and Predictions
Within our diffusing-particle framework, the memory of an item is represented by
the location of a diffusing particle. This representation allows us to quantify the corruption
(i.e., reduced precision) of the memory by two distinct sources of noise. The first is
described by a static, additive term (1) that encompasses all potential one-time noise
sources within a trial including noise associated with the sensory encoding and the motor
response. The second is the dynamic degradation of memory precision over time that is
modeled as the diffusion of the particle (Fig. 2.2a). This diffusion corresponds to an
increase in variability over time that is linear, with a slope equal to the diffusion constant
(12; Fig. 2.2b). Consistent with past modeling studies (Bays et al., 2009; Brady & Alvarez,
2015; Koyluoglu et al., 2017; Wei et al., 2012), we accounted for the decrease in workingmemory fidelity with item load by incorporating item number (N) dependence into both
the static noise term (N) and the diffusion constant of each particle (N2; Fig. 2.2b).
We extended this framework to account for working-memory representations of
values computed from multiple stimuli, namely their average location, via two primary
models (these models also served as the basis for more complex extensions, including
mixtures of the two models, used to account for the Sequential condition detailed in
subsequent sections). In the first, called the Average-then-Diffuse (AtD) model, the
average is calculated immediately upon observing the evidence and then stored as a single
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particle in working memory. This model has its own static noise term that includes
variability in estimates of the mean of N items (MN) and then assumes that the single
estimate held in working memory diffuses with the same diffusion constant as a single
perceived item (σMN2 =12; see the parallel purple and black lines in Fig. 2.2b and the
overlapping lines in Fig. 2.2c). In the second, called the Diffuse-then-Average (DtA)
model, the memories of all constituent items are maintained and then combined into a
decision variable (the average) only at the time of the response. This model assumes an
effective diffusion constant for the reported average that is related to σN2 by the inverse of
the number of items (σMN 2 = σN2/N) because averaging over N random variables with a
variability of σN2 results in a random variable with variability σN2/N.
The ability to distinguish these two models depends on their relative ability to
capture specific changes in error over time in the report of the average, which in turn
depends on the relationship between the diffusion constant of a single item and multiple
items. We describe this relationship as σN2=σ12*NA, where A describes the cost to store N
items in memory. Because of the previously described relationships between σ12, σN2, and
σMN2 it is therefore also true that in the AtD model σN2=σMN2 * NA, whereas in the DtA
model σMN2=σ12 * NA/N. For a given static noise level and σ12, the A parameter dictates
whether AtD or DtA has a lower σMN 2 and thus results in lower memory loss over time
(Fig. 2.2c). Specifically, when A<1, DtA has a lower σMN 2 and less variable responses
because the averaging over multiple diffusing items counteracts the greater total noise of
having many items. When A=1, the additional noise cost of each individual point in DtA
exactly balances the effect of averaging, such that AtD and DtA have equal σMN 2 and equal
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levels of accuracy and thus are indistinguishable (Figure 2.2 – figure supplement 1 shows
the models becoming increasingly indistinguishable as A approaches one). When A>1, the
additional cost of storing multiple items outweighs the effect of averaging, and AtD
produces a lower σMN 2 and less variable responses than DtA. A summary of all framework
variables can be found in Table 2.1.
To summarize, our two models describe two different possible ways for decisionrelevant information to be stored in working memory prior to executing a decision. The
different storage strategies result in different patterns of memory degradation,
corresponding to trial-to-trial variability (imprecision) of decision reports that increase as
a function of the length of the within-trial delay period. For the AtD model, the individual
pieces of information are immediately combined into a single decision variable that is then
stored in memory. Thus, the rate of degradation of an estimated average is identical to the
rate of degradation of a single item. In contrast, for the DtA model, all of the relevant pieces
of information are stored in memory and then combined only at the time of indicating the
decision. Thus, the rate of degradation of an estimated average is inversely proportional to
the rate of degradation of each item held in memory. We used fits of these models to
performance data from individual participants to distinguish different patterns of memory
degradation and therefore different storage strategies.
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Table 2.1: Descriptions of all particle framework and model parameters

Fit Model
Parameters
(units)
1 (deg2)
N (deg2)

MN (deg2)

Description

Variants
for Sequential
conditions

Static noise for a single item
Static noise for N items

NE (deg2)
NL (deg2)
MN_seq

Static noise for mean of N
items

(deg2)

Description

Static noise for Early items
Static noise for Late items
Static noise for mean of N
items in Sequential
Conditions

σ12
(deg2/sec)
A (no units)

Diffusion constant tor single
item
Diffusion cost of storing N
items
Derived descriptive terms
σN 2
Diffusion constant for N items
(deg2/sec)
= σ12*NA
σMN 2
(deg2/sec)

Diffusion constant for mean
of N items
AtD:
=σ12

σNE 2
(deg2/sec)
σNL 2
(deg2/sec)
σMN_Seq 2
(deg2/sec)

Diffusion constant for Early
items
Diffusion constant for Late
items
Diffusion constant for mean
of N items in Sequential
Conditions

DtA:
= σ12*NA/N
= σN 2/N
Table 2.1: Descriptions of all particle framework and model parameters. Fit parameters are
shown on the top. Derived parameters used in other analyses and descriptions are shown on the
bottom. Variations used to model Sequential conditions are shown to the right.
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Figure 2.2: Diffusion model and predictions for different strategies

Figure 2.2: Diffusion model and predictions for different strategies. a) 50 simulated trials of
the representation of a single memorandum, x̂i, corrupted by a static noise term representing
sensory and motor noise (η1) and time-dependent noise (increasing variance corresponding to
decreasing memory precision) modeled as Brownian diffusion. At time t, the report for 1 item,
rt,1, is the location of the particle. b) Linear accumulation of noise (variance) for single or
multiple Perceived items (colors, as indicated) or Computed mean values using two different
strategies (solid versus dashed black lines, as indicated). Memory representations of N=1, 2, or
5 items have initial, additive error N and diffuse over time with diffusion constant N2; thus,
variance at time t is N + t*N2. For the Average-then-Diffuse (AtD) model, the average is
calculated immediately and stored as a single value. Thus, the diffusion constant of a Computed
mean of N items is the same as for one item (MN2 = 12; parallel purple and black lines),
although 1 and MN may not be equal. For the Diffuse-then-Average (DtA) model, all items
are stored until the probe time. Thus, the effective MN2 is 1/Nth of N2. c) Relationship between
A and log differences of diffusion constants for various set sizes and models. 12 is independent
from A and equal to MN2 under AtD. N2 is linear with A in log space with respect to (12)
because log(N2)–log(N2) = A*log(N). MN2 in DtA is likewise linear with A. DC = Diffusion
Constant. d) Accumulation of noise for Perceived items presented sequentially. When the new
(Late) point is added at time T/2, the diffusion constant for previously presented items (Early)
changes slightly because of the increased load. Early and Late items for set size N have
encoding noise NE and NL, respectively, represented by (E/L). The “effective Early” trace
shows the net gain in variance over time that would be expected when sampling the error only
at a single time T, as we did. e) Accumulation of noise for Computed items in the Sequential
condition for both models. The encoding noise for the mean of N items is represented by MNSeq.
At time=T/2, the final point is introduced, causing a change in the total variance. The
“effective” lines represent the measured change in variance over time one would measure when
recording only at T. Here N=5, A=0.5.
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Figure 2.2 – figure supplement 1: Identifiability of AtD and DtA models as a function of the
A parameters. a) Simulations from set size 2. b) Simulations from set size 5. For each
participant, 1000 task simulations were generated using their best-fit model and parameters,
and then each simulation was refit to both the AtD and DtA model and the fits compared via
log-likelihoods. The ordinate indicates the percentage of those simulations for which the true
(simulate) generative model was identified correctly. In general, identifiability was higher
when A was not near 1, as expected, and for set size 5 versus 2.
Figure 2.2 – figure supplement 1: Identifiability of AtD and DtA models as a function of the A parameters

Simultaneous Condition
Simultaneous condition behavior
When all disks were presented simultaneously, performance was consistent with
several key predictions of the particle model. Specifically, the difference in reports of
Perceived spatial angles and the true probed location (i.e., the response error) tended to be
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unbiased, in that the mean error across participants was not reliably different from zero
(Fig. 2.3a, full distributions in Figure 2.3 – figure supplement 1, individual participant
mean errors in Figure 2.3 – figure supplements 2). However, the variance of these errors
increased roughly linearly over time (Fig. 2.3c), like the location of a diffusing particle or
bump attractor (Compte, 2000; Kilpatrick, 2018; Kilpatrick et al., 2013; Laing & Chow,
2001). This error variance depended systematically on set size (Fig. 2.3c). However, the
change in error variance over time (slope of variance increase) did not depend on set size
(ANOVA, significant effect of set size, F(2,32)=83.87, p=1.88e-13, and delay,
F(2,32)=29.55, p=5.37e-08, but no significant interaction between set size and delay,
F(4,64)=1.36, p=0.256). Errors in reports of Computed (i.e., inferred mean) spatial angles
relative to true mean angles showed similar trends, albeit with a much weaker dependence
on the number of items. Specifically, Computed angle reports were also unbiased (mean
error from the true value was not reliably different from zero; Figs. 2.3b, Figure 2.3 – figure
supplement 1,3) but degraded (became more variable) with a roughly linear increase in
variance over time (Fig. 2.3d). Error variance in the report of the Computed average was
higher at higher set sizes (set size 5 had higher variances), but the rate of degradation in
accuracy did not depend on set size (ANOVA, significant effect of set size, F(2,32)=13.53
p=5.515e-5, and delay, F(2,32)=130.79, p=4.441e-16, but not their interaction, F(4,64)=
0.538, p=0.708).
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Figure 2.3: Behavioral summary for the Simultaneous condition. a) Mean Perceptual error
for different set sizes (colors, as indicated) and delay times (abscissa). Filled points indicate
two-tailed t-test for H0: mean=0, p<0.05. b) Mean Computed (inferred mean) error for
different set sizes (colors, as indicated) and delay times (abscissa). For all tests, mean error
was not significantly different from zero (p>0.05; open circles). c) Variance in Perceptual
errors, plotted as in a. d) Variance in Computed (mean) errors, plotted as in b. In each panel,
points and error bars are mean±SEM across participants.
Figure 2.3: Behavioral summary for the Simultaneous condition
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Figure 2.3 – figure supplement 1: Full error distributions in Simultaneous conditions. Each
panel shows a histogram of mean error for different delays (colors, as indicated). Perceived
trials: a) set size=1; b) set size=2; c) set size=5. Computed trials: d) set size=2; e) set size=5. In
each panel, points and error bars are mean±SEM across all participants. Note that in all cases,
95% of the distributions fall between -30 and 30, justifying our exclusion of larger errors as
off-target responses.
Figure 2.3 – figure supplement 1: Full error distributions in Simultaneous conditions
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Figure 2.3 – figure supplement 2: Participant-wise mean response error in the Simultaneous
Perceived condition. a) Delay=0 s, set size=1. b) Delay=0, set size=2. c) Delay=0 s, set size
=5. d–f) Same as in a–c, but for delay of 1 s. g–i) Same as in a–c, but for delay of 6 s. In all
panels, errorbars are ±95% confidence intervals. Filled points indicate that 0 is not included in
the confidence interval; i.e., there was a bias in the given participant’s errors.
Figure 2.3 – figure supplement 2: Participant-wise mean response error in the Simultaneous Perceived condition
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Figure 2.3 – figure supplement 3: Participant-wise mean error in the Simultaneous Computed
condition. a) Delay=0 s, set size=2. b) Delay of 0, set size=5. c–d) Same as in a–b, but for
delay of 1 s. e-–f) Same as in a–b, but for delay of 6 s. In all panels, errorbars are ±95%
confidence intervals. Filled points indicate that 0 is not included in the confidence interval; i.e.,
there was a bias in the given participant’s errors.
Figure 2.3 – figure supplement 3: Participant-wise mean error in the Simultaneous Computed condition

Simultaneous condition model fits
To better understand the effects of delay and set size on working-memory
representations of Perceived and Computed angles for individual participants, we fit the
AtD and DtA models separately to data from each set size (N=2 or 5) condition and
participant (Table 2.2; the two models each had the same number of free parameters and
thus were compared using the log-likelihoods obtained from the fits). The fitting
procedures for both models used data from all trials from Perceived set size 1 and set size
N conditions, and from Computed set size N conditions. In general, both strategies were
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used by our participants in each of the two set-size conditions (for set size 2, 8 and 9
participants were best fit by the AtD and DtA model, respectively; for set size 5, 14 and 3
participants were best fit by the AtD and DtA model, respectively).
Set
size
(N)
AtD

DtA

Number best- η1
fit
participants

ηN

ηMN

σ12

A

2

8

10.79±1.45

16.49±2.67

9.39±1.07

4.85±0.44

0.0892±0.24

5

14

9.80±1.18

36.88±5.33

14.79±1.50

4.34±0.47

0.0051±0.07*

2

9

8.22±1.35

14.16±3.13

10.45±2.09

3.67±0.58

0.61±0.22

5

3

7.63±0.30

45.49±17.03

21.10±7.59

5.14±0.28

0.49±0.14*

Table 2.2: Summary of model fits for the Simultaneous condition. Parameters are: 1) η1, static
noise for a single item; 2) ηN, static noise for N items; 3) ηMN, static noise for the mean of N
items; 4) σ12, diffusion constant for a single item; and 5) A, diffusion cost for additional items.
For each parameter, the maximum-likelihood estimates are given for the participants best fit
by the indicated model (mean±SEM across participants). * indicates t-test for H0: difference
between the mean values of each parameter across models for a given set size=0, p<0.05.
Table 2.2: Summary of model fits for the Simultaneous condition

Because the two models are indistinguishable when A=1 (i.e., σMN2=σ12=
σ12*NA/N=𝜎N2/N), we further analyzed best-fitting values of A. Across our participants, the
95% confidence intervals for A (determined from the SEM values shown in Table 2.2) did
not overlap with 1, supporting the distinguishability of the two models, on average
(although not for each individual participant; Figure 2.4 – figure supplement 1). Moreover,
best-fitting values of A were similar when they were estimated separately from Perceived
versus Computed blocks for DtA participants (two-sided test for H0: difference in mean
best-fitting values across participants=0, p=0.895 and 0.452 for set sizes 2 and 5,
respectively; note that A is not defined for the AtD model on Computed blocks alone),
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which supports our modeling assumption that A (the cost of storing N items in memory) is
roughly the same in the two blocks. For the participants best fit by the AtD model, the
mean, best-fitting values of A for both set sizes were close to zero. These values were
consistent with the lack of interaction between set size and delay in the Perceptual ANOVA
in Fig. 2.3c (because in this model, σN2=σ12 when A=0). Conversely, for the participants
best fit by the DtA model, the mean, best-fitting values of A were slightly higher (the
difference between each parameter between groups for a given set size was only
significantly different from zero for A at set size 5; see Table 2.2). These values were
consistent with the lack of interaction between set size and delay in the Computed ANOVA
in Fig. 2.3d (because in this model, σMN2=σ12 * NA/N, which becomes less dependent on N
when A approaches 1).
Simultaneous condition model validation
When A differs from one, AtD and DtA make distinct assumptions about the
diffusion constant relationships between either single (AtD) or multiple (DtA) Perceived
angles(s) versus a Computed average angle (Fig. 2.2b,c). We used these assumptions to
validate whether the better-fitting model and best-fit parameters for a given participant at
a given set size were likely to produce the participant’s behavior. Specifically, the AtD
model assumes that the diffusion constant for a single Perceived angle and for a Computed
average angle are the same because both involve the memory of a single value (eq. 9). In
contrast, the DtA model assumes that the diffusion constant for a Computed average angle
is 1/Nth the diffusion constant for N items, because all N items are held in memory prior to
averaging (eq.10). We analyzed how consistent these assumptions were with the behavioral
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data (Fig. 2.4). For each participant, we fit a line to the measured error variances as a
function of delay for a given set size in both Perceived and Computed blocks to estimate
the change in variance over time (the empirical diffusion constant estimates: 𝜎̂12, 𝜎̂N2, 𝜎̂MN2,
where N=2 or 5 for the two set sizes). We then compared the differences of these empirical
Figure 2.4: Comparisons of empirical and model-based diffusion constant relationships for the Simultaneous
condition

Figure 2.4: Comparisons of empirical and model-based diffusion constant relationships for
the Simultaneous condition. In panels a,b,d,e, the abscissa shows the difference between: 1)
empirical estimates of the diffusion constant for a Computed value measured by fitting a line
to measured variance as a function of delay time for set size 2 (𝜎̂M22, a,b) or 5 (𝜎̂M22, d,e), and
2) the empirical estimates of the diffusion constant for a single Perceived value (𝜎̂12). The AtD
model predicts a difference of zero. The ordinate shows the difference between: 1) the
empirical estimate of Computed diffusion constants 𝜎̂M22 or 𝜎̂M52, and 2) the empirical
estimates of the diffusion constant for multiple Perceived values (𝜎̂22 or 𝜎̂52) divided by the
number of items. The DtA model predicts a difference of zero. Each point was obtained using
data from individual participants, separated by whether they were best fit by the AtD (a,b) or
DtA (d,e) model for the given set-size condition. Lines represent 95% confidence intervals
computed by simulating data using the best-fit parameters for the given fit and repeating the
empirical estimate comparison procedure. Closed symbols indicate participants who fell
within the 95% confidence interval for their best-fit model. e and f) Distance of each
participant’s empirically estimated diffusion constant relationships from those predicted by
AtD or DtA (i.e., distances from the x=0 and y=0 lines, respectively, in a,b,d,e), for set sizes
2 (c) and 5 (f).
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Figure 2.4 – figure supplement 1: Participant-specific estimates of A from the Simultaneous
condition for set size 2 (a) and 5 (b). Symbols indicate best-fitting model (AtD or DtA), as
indicated. In all panels, errorbars are ±95% confidence intervals based on the Hessian computed
during model fitting. Note that A=0 implies no difference between the diffusion constant for a
single and N items, whereas A=1 implies that the variance and diffusion constant relationship
predictions of the AtD and DtA models are equal and thus the models cannot be distinguished
from each other.
Figure 2.4 – figure supplement 1: Participant-specific estimates of A from the Simultaneous condition

estimates to the differences predicted between diffusion constants by the best fit model for
a given participant.
In general, the participant data conformed to the model predictions of the best-fit
model for that participant, despite substantial individual variability. For participants whose
data were best fit by the AtD model, empirical estimates of the diffusion constant (𝜎̂MN2)
from Computed blocks tended to be similar to the empirical estimates of the diffusion
constant for a single Perceptual point (𝜎̂12; Fig. 2.4a,b). Specifically, for all but two
participants, the empirical diffusion constant differences fell within the 95% confidence
interval of the simulated distribution. Likewise, for participants whose data were best fit
by the DtA model, empirical estimates of the diffusion constant (𝜎̂MN2) from Computed
blocks tended to be similar to the empirical estimates of the diffusion constant for multiple
Perceptual items divided by the set size (𝜎̂N2/N; Fig. 2.4d,e). Specifically, for all but one
participant, empirical diffusion constant differences fell within the 95% confidence interval
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of the simulated distribution. These analyses, which are summarized in Fig. 2.4c,f, thus
support the idea that for most participants, their behavior was well captured by their betterfitting model.
Summaries of the predicted report-error variances by the AtD and DtA fits for wellfit participants are shown in Fig. 2.5. Overall, the model predictions qualitatively match
participant behavior. In general, AtD behavior was predicted by diffusion constants that
were the same for either one Perceived location or the mean Computed location based on
2 or 5 items (i.e., parallel lines in Fig. 2.5e,g). DtA behavior was well predicted by diffusion
constants that were larger for multiple Perceived items compared to Single Perceived items
(Fig. 2.5f,h). As predicted by the DtA model, the Computed errors for DtA participants
were well predicted by 1/Nth the diffusion constant for multiple Perceived items (Fig. 2.5eh). We also compared the variance in AtD and DtA participants’ reports of the mean across
delays using an ANOVA and multiple comparisons. For set size 2, AtD participants had a
significantly higher variance in their reports than DtA participants at delay 6 (p=0.018),
reflecting the lower effective diffusion constant of the mean for DtA than AtD when A<1,
as was the case for our participants, on average. For set size 5, there were no significant
differences in variability at any delay between models (p>0.05). This lack of statistical
difference may reflect the low number of participants at set size 5 and/or the fact that the
A values of the DtA using participants at set size 5 was closer to 1, when AtD and DtA
perform identically.
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Figure 2.5: Comparison of model prediction to participant data for the Simultaneous
condition. Each panel shows the empirical variance of participant errors (points and error bars
are mean±SEM data across participants) and model predictions (lines, based on the mean bestfitting parameters across participants for the given model) for the participants best fit by the
given model (AtD or DtA) for the given condition, as labeled above each column. a–d)
Perceived blocks. e–h) Computed blocks.
Figure 2.5: Comparison of model prediction to participant data for the Simultaneous condition

Simultaneous condition strategy comparisons
Across the population, participants seemed to have different tendencies to use the
two strategies (AtD or DtA) for the two set-size conditions (Fig. 2.6). For set size 2, equal
numbers of well-fit participants were best fit by the AtD (n=8) and the DtA (n=8), and as
such neither model was significantly more likely to be a better fit across the population
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p=0.756, Fig. 2.6a, blue items). Conversely, for set size 5,
more well-fit participants were better fit by the AtD (n=12) than the DtA (n=3) model
(p=0.0027; Fig. 2.6a, green items). Participants who were not poorly fit at either set size
were more likely to be better fit by AtD in set size 5 compared to set size 2 (Wilcoxon
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signed-rank two-sided test for equal median log-likelihoods difference of fits of the two
models across set sizes, p=0.029). We also found these results were robust to uncertainty
associated with model identifiability (participant-wise identifiability is given in Figure 2.2
– figure supplement 1). Specifically, given different possible distributions of underlying
strategy prevalence (proportions), the probability of obtaining the empirically observed
distributions of models shown in Fig. 2.6a for either set size while considering the average
model identifiability was peaked near the observed strategy proportions. This result
demonstrates that the observed proportions were not likely obtained due misidentificationrelated chance. These probabilities distributions were also highly non-overlapping, which
is consistent with a different prevalence of strategy use at the two different set sizes (Fig.
2.6b). These differences in strategy use did not correlate with the ages of the participants
(Pearson correlation, Figure 2.6 – figure supplement 1, p>0.20). These findings suggest
that working-memory load might have affected our participants’ decision strategies, such
that a higher load corresponded to an increased tendency to discard information about
individual samples (disk locations) and hold only the relevant computed decision variable
in memory.
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Figure 2.6. Strategy use prevalence in the population. a) Difference in log likelihood between
AtD and DtA fits for the Simultaneous condition. Each point represents the difference in fit
log likelihoods for one participant; horizontal bars are medians (solid bar for set size 5 indicates
two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test for H0: median=0, p=0.0027). Positive values favor DtA,
whereas negative favor AtD. Grey lines connect data generated by the same participant. Only
participants whose data were well matched to one of the two models (i.e., within the 95%
confidence intervals depicted in Fig. 4) were included. b) Probability of obtaining proportion
of participants best fit by each model given average model identifiability of participant
parameters. Probability of the results at set size 5 skew toward a higher proportion of AtD users
compared to set size 2.
Figure 2.6. Strategy use prevalence in the population
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Figure 2.6 – figure supplement 1: Relationship between log likelihood difference for the two
strategies and age for the Simultaneous condition. Log likelihood comparison for AtD and DtA
(negative favors AtD) for set sizes 2 and 5 is not dependent upon age (correlation, ps>0.20
computed separately for each set size).
Figure 2.6 – figure supplement 1: Relationship between log likelihood difference for the two strategies and age for the
Simultaneous condition

Sequential Condition
Sequential condition behavior
For the Sequential condition, we separately analyzed errors for Perceived reports
of disks presented at the beginning (Early) or middle (Late) of a trial. Early Perceived
reports tended to be relatively unbiased (two-sided t-test for H0: mean error=0, p>0.05; Fig.
2.7a, full distributions in Figure 2.7 – figure supplement 1; individual participant mean
errors in Figure 2.7 – figure supplement 2a-d) but became more variable over time in a
roughly linear manner (Fig. 2.7d), consistent with the predictions of the particle-diffusion
models. For higher set sizes, errors were more variable than at lower set sizes. The rate of
variance increase over time did not depend on set size (ANOVA, significant effect of set
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size, F(2,32)=33.44, p=1.45e-08, and delay, F(1,16)=77.02, p=1.64e-07, but not their
interaction, F(2,32)=0.15, p=0.256). Late Perceived reports were likewise unbiased (mean
error not significantly different from zero; Fig. 2.7b, full distributions in Figure 2.7 – figure
supplement 1; individual participant mean errors in Figure 2.7 – figure supplement 2e-h )
and degraded in precision (i.e., increased in variance) over time (Fig.7e). However, this
degradation did not depend on set size (ANOVA, significant effect of delay,
F(1,16)=39.28, p=1.12e-05, but not set size, F(1,16)=0.90, p= 0.36 or their interaction,
F(1,16)=0.0029, p=0.96).
Conversely, Computed (i.e., inferred mean) reports that required integrating both
Early and Late items tended to be slightly biased towards the Early items for set size 2
(mean=13% of the distance between the two disks closer to the Early point than a true
mean; student two-sided t-test, p<0.001) but not set size 5 (mean=3.5% closer to the mean
of N–1 items than the true mean of all items; p>0.5; Fig. 2.7c, full distributions in Figure
2.7 – figure supplement 1; individual participant mean errors in Figure 2.7 – figure
supplement 3). The Computed report errors also increased in variance over time (Fig. 2.7f).
These overall errors of bias and variance did not change dramatically with training (t-tests
for differences in mean and standard deviation of report errors between first and second
half of trials=0, p>0.05 in all cases). However, the magnitude of the errors of variance, and
their change over time, depended systematically on the number of items to remember, such
that more items corresponded to a slightly greater overall variance in reports at short delays,
but less gain in variance over time (ANOVA, significant effect of set size, F(2,32)=7.73
p=1.8e-3, delay, F(1,16)=73.76, p=2.18e-07, and their interaction, F(2,32)= 6.81, p=3.4e-
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3). This interaction of delay and set size suggests the representation of the Computed value
diffused in working memory with a different diffusion constant than for a single Perceived
value. Such an interaction is consistent with predictions of both the AtD and DtA models
under these conditions, though the nature of this interaction depends on the specific model,
as detailed below.

Figure 2.7: Behavioral summary for the Sequential condition. a) Mean error for initially
presented (Early) Perceptual items for different set sizes (colors, as indicated) and delay time
(abscissa). b) Mean error for midway presented (Late) Perceptual items for different set sizes
(colors, as indicated) and delay time (abscissa). c) Mean Computed (inferred mean) error for
different set sizes (colors, as indicated) and delay time (abscissa). Filled points in a-c indicate
two-tailed student t-test for H0: mean=0, p<0.05. d) Variance in Early Perceptual errors plotted
as in a. e) Variance in Late Perceptual errors, plotted as in b. f) Variance in Computed (mean)
errors, plotted as in c. In each panel, points and error bars are mean ± SEM across participants.
Figure 2.7: Behavioral summary for the Sequential condition
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Figure 2.7 – figure supplement 1: Full error distributions in Sequential conditions. Each
panel shows a histogram of mean error for different delays (colors, as indicated). Perceived
Early: a) set size=2; b) set size=5. Perceived Late: c) set size=2; d) set size=5. Computed
trials: e) set size=2; f) set size=5. In each panel, points and error bars are mean±SEM across
all participants. Note that in all cases, 95% of the distributions fall between -30 and 30,
justifying our exclusion of larger errors as off-target responses.
Figure 2.7 – figure supplement 1: Full error distributions in Sequential conditions
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Figure 2.7 – figure supplement 2: Participant-wise mean error in the Sequential Perceived
condition. a) Delay=1 s, set size=2 for Early samples. b) Delay=1, set size=5 for Early samples.
c–d) Same as in a–b, but for delay of 6 s. e) Delay=0.5 s, set size=2 for Late samples. f)
Delay=0.5 s, set size=5 for Late samples. g–h) Same as in e–f, but for delay of 3 s. In all panels,
errorbars are ±95% confidence intervals. Filled points indicate that 0 is not included in the
confidence interval; i.e., there was a bias in the given participant’s errors.
Figure 2.7 – figure supplement 2: Participant-wise mean error in the Sequential Perceived condition
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Figure 2.7 – figure supplement 3: Participant-wise mean error in the Sequential Computed
condition. a) Delay=1 s, set size=2. b) Delay=1, set size=5. c–d) Same as in a–b, but for delay
of 6 s. In all panels, errorbars are ±95% confidence intervals. Filled points indicate that 0 is not
included in the confidence interval; i.e., there was a bias in the given participant’s errors (which
in this case tended to be towards the mean computed from the early items).
Figure 2.7 – figure supplement 3: Participant-wise mean error in the Sequential Computed condition

Sequential condition model fitting
To better understand the effects of delay and set size on working-memory
representations of Perceived and Computed locations for individual participants under
Sequential conditions, we fit the AtD and DtA models separately to data from each
condition and participant (Table 2.3; the two models each had the same number of free
parameters and thus were compared using the log-likelihoods of the fits). Recall that the
ηN parameters quantify the effect of set size on non-time-dependent noise (noise when
delay is zero), whereas σ12 is the model-based estimate of the diffusion constant for a single
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Perceived point. In general, both strategies were used by our participants in each of the two
set-size conditions (for set size 2, 9 and 8 participants were best fit by the AtD and DtA
model, respectively; for set size 5, 9 and 8 participants were best fit by the AtD and DtA
model, respectively).

AtD

DtA

Set size
(N)

Number
η1
best-fit
participants

ηNE

ηNL

ηMN-seq

σ12

2

9

9.44±1.47

20.32±3.89

16.18±3.16 14.02±1.58 4.44±0.73 -0.34±0.44

5

9

10.69±1.21

37.06±5.22

13.19±2.06 15.94±1.69 4.22±0.73 -0.09±0.15

2

8

10.25±1.53

18.30±3.31

17.43±1.88 14.00±3.11 4.58±0.52 -3.00±2.58

5

8

9.11±1.69

36.59±5.54

22.27±4.37 24.45±4.60 4.43±0.57 -3.89±2.90

A

Table 2.3: Summary of model fits for the Sequential condition. Parameters are: 1) η1, non-timedependent noise of a single value; 2) ηNE, non-time-dependent noise of the Early N–1 items; 3)
ηNL, non-time-dependent noise of the Late Nth item; 4) ηMN-seq, non-time-dependent noise of the
mean of N items; 5) σ12, diffusion constant of a single point; and 6) A, diffusion cost of additional
items. For each parameter, the maximum likelihood estimates (mean over participants±SEM) is
given for the participants best fit with a particular model.
Table 2.3: Summary of model fits for the Sequential condition.

Like in the Simultaneous condition, the models make identical predictions when
A=1. Across the population, 95% confidence intervals of A did not overlap with one,
supporting the distinguishability of the two models; however, this difference from one was
not always true for individual participants (Estimates of A on a participant-by-participant
basis are shown in Figure 2.8 – figure supplement 1). For a given set size, none of the fit
parameter estimates differed significantly when comparing their best-fitting values from
AtD versus DtA participants (t tests, p>0.05 in all cases). For participants best fit by AtD
at both set sizes, the average A was close to zero, which is consistent with the lack of
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interaction between set size and delay seen in the Early and Late Perceptual ANOVA.
Unlike in the Simultaneous Condition, the participants best fit by DtA had negative A
values at both set sizes, implying that the diffusion constant for multiple Perceived items
became closer to zero as the number of items increased. While counterintuitive to the
concept that adding more items should increase the diffusion constant, negative A values
can be explained by ceiling effects: if a participant has high levels of static noise (such as
in set size 5), their performance has less room to degrade while they continue to accurately
track the target. As such, the rate of increase in variability NE2 cannot be very large and
may be smaller than 12, which translates into a negative A value. Alternatively, the
presentation of a new item may have had a stabilizing effect on the ensemble by creating
directional drift towards the new item rather than random diffusion in the remaining items
(Almeida et al., 2015; Wei et al., 2012), which is not inherently accounted for in any of the
present models.
Sequential condition model validation
The Sequential condition models also make predictions about the relationship
between the diffusion constants of remembered Computed and Perceived values. Once
again, we assessed how well participant behavior matched these assumptions, detailed in
eq. 11 for AtD and eq. 12 for DtA (Fig. 2.8). We fit a line to the measured variances in
reporting error as a function of delay for a given set size in both Perceived and Computed
Sequential blocks to estimate the change in variance over time (the empirical diffusion
constant estimates: 𝜎̂12, 𝜎̂NE2, 𝜎̂NL2, 𝜎̂MN-seq2, where N=2 or 5 for the two set sizes). We then
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compared the difference of these empirical estimates to the predictions of the best-fit model
for each participant (Fig. 2.8).

Figure 2.8: Comparisons of empirical and model-based diffusion constants. In panels a,b,d,e,
the abscissa shows the difference between: 1) empirical estimates of the diffusion constant for
a Computed value measured by fitting a line to measured variance as a function of delay time
for set size 2 (𝜎̂M2_Seq2, a,b) or 5 (𝜎̂M5_Seq2, d,e), and 2) the empirical estimates of the diffusion
constant for a single Perceived value (𝜎̂12) multiplied by the appropriate factor for the set size.
The AtD model predicts a difference of zero. The ordinate shows the difference between: 1)
the empirical estimate of Computed diffusion constants 𝜎̂M2_Seq2 or 𝜎̂M5_Seq2, and 2) the empirical
estimates of the diffusion constant of a Computed value based on the DtA hypothesis. The DtA
model predicts a difference of zero. Points are data from individual participants, separated by
whether they were best fit by the AtD (a,b) or DtA (d.e) model for the given set-size condition.
Lines are 95% confidence intervals computed by simulating data using the best-fit parameters
for the given fit and repeating the empirical estimate comparison procedure. Close symbols
indicate participants who fell within the 95% confidence interval for their best-fit model. e and
f) Distance of each participant’s empirically estimated diffusion constant relationships from
those predicted by AtD or DtA (i.e., distances from the x=0 and y=0 lines, respectively, in
a,b,d,e), for set sizes 2 (c) and 5 (f).
Figure 2.8: Comparisons of empirical and model-based diffusion constants
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Figure 2.8 – figure supplement 1: Participant-specific estimates of A from the Sequential
condition for set size 2 (a) and 5 (b). Symbols indicate best-fitting model (AtD or DtA), as
indicated. In all panels, errorbars are ±95% confidence intervals based on the Hessian computed
during model fitting. Note that A=0 implies no difference between the diffusion constant for a
single and N items, whereas A=1 implies that the variance and diffusion constant relationship
predictions of the AtD and DtA models are equal and thus the models cannot be distinguished
from each other.
Figure 2.8 – figure supplement 1: Participant-specific estimates of A from the Sequential condition

In general, the participant data conformed to the model predictions of the best-fit
model for each participant, despite substantial individual variability. For participants
whose data were best fit by the AtD model (n=9 for both set sizes), the difference between
empirical estimates of the diffusion constant (𝜎̂MN-seq2) from Computed blocks and the
model-predicted equivalent fraction of the empirical estimates of the diffusion constant for
a single point tended to be low (Fig. 2.8a,b). Specifically, for every participant the
empirical diffusion constant differences fell within the 95% confidence interval computed
from simulations using the model fits. For participants whose data were best fit by the DtA
model (n=8 for both set sizes), empirical estimates of the diffusion constant (𝜎̂MN2) from
Computed blocks tended to be similar to the expected average of empirical estimates of the
diffusion constant for multiple items (0.5𝜎̂NL2+(N–1)* 𝜎̂NE2)/N2 ; Fig. 2.8d,e). Specifically,
for 7 participants, empirical diffusion constant differences fell within the 95% confidence
interval computed from simulations using the model fits. The remaining participant was
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considered poorly fit and not considered in further analyses. These analyses, which are
summarized in Fig. 2.8c,f, thus support the idea that for most participants, their behavior
was well captured by their better-fitting model.
Summaries of the predictions of report errors variances for AtD and DtA fits are
shown in Fig. 2.9. In general, participants best fit by AtD exhibited diffusion constants that
were, on average, lower for Computed than Perceived values (Fig. 2.9i,k; lower slope of
cyan/blue line versus purple line). This difference decreased with increased set size, which
is expected from the averaging process. Additionally, both the Early and Late variances
were, on average, fairly well matched by their model predictions (Fig. 2.9a,e,c,g).
Conversely, participants best fit by DtA exhibited diffusion constants that were notably
smaller for Computed mean locations versus single Perceived locations (Fig. 2.9j,l; lower
slope of cyan/blue line versus purple line). The corresponding average predictions by the
best fit DtA models for error variance of Early and Late items also aligned with participant
data from DtA fit participants (Fig. 2.9 b,f,d,h). We also compared the variance in AtD and
DtA participants’ reports of the mean across delays using an ANOVA and multiple
comparisons but found no significant differences in variability at any delay between
models (p>0.05).
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Figure 2.9. Comparison of model fits for the Sequential condition. Each panel shows the
empirical variance of participant errors (points and error bars are mean±SEM data across
participants) and model predictions (lines, using mean predicted variance from each
participant’s best-fitting parameters for the given model) for the participants best fit by the
given model (AtD or DtA) for the given condition, as labeled above each column. a-d) Errors
for Ealy items in Perceived Sequential blocks. e-h) Errors for Late items in Sequential
Perceived blocks. i-l) Errors for Sequential Computed blocks.
Figure 2.9. Comparison of model fits for the Sequential condition

Sequential condition strategy comparisons
Across the population, participants had roughly equal tendencies to use either one
the two strategies (AtD or DtA) for the two set-size conditions (Fig. 2.10). For set size 2,
one more participant was best fit by the AtD (n=9) versus the DtA (n=8) model (Wilcoxon
signed-rank two-sided test for the median difference in the log-likelihoods of fits of the
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Figure 2.10. Assessment of strategy use prevalence in the population in Sequential conditions.
a). Difference in log likelihood per well-fit participant AtD and DtA fits. Negative values favor
AtD. Each point represents the difference in fit log likelihoods for one participant and data from
the same participant are connected across set sizes; horizontal bars are medians. Positive values
favor DtA, whereas negative values favor AtD. We failed to reject the null hypothesis (twosided Wilcoxon signed rank test for H0: median=0, p>0.05) for both set sizes. b). Probability of
obtaining proportion of participants best fit by each model given average model identifiability
of each participant parameters. Probability of the results at set sizes 2 and 5 are most likely when
the probability of AtD and DtA are similar.
Figure 2.10. Assessment of strategy use prevalence in the population in Sequential conditions

two models to data from each participant=0, p=0.868). For set size 5, two more participants
were best fit by the AtD (n=9) versus the DtA (n=7) model (p=0.234). Participants well fit
at either set size were not significantly more likely to be fit by either model across set sizes
(Wilcoxon signed-rank two-sided test for identical median log-likelihoods difference of
fits of the two models across set size, p=0.283). Given different possible distributions of
underlying strategy prevalence (proportions), the probability of obtaining the empirically
observed distributions of models shown in Fig. 2.10a for either set size while considering
the average model identifiability was peaked near the observed strategy proportions. This
result demonstrates that the observed proportions were not likely obtained due
misidentification-related chance (Fig. 2.10b). These differences in strategy use did not
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correlate with age of participants (Figure 2.10 – figure supplement 1 Pearson correlation,
p>0.20). Thus, on average, participants lost fidelity in their representations of a Computed
value when it needed to be computed from sequentially presented information, as in many
processes of evidence accumulation. The dynamics of this degradation differed for the two
strategies, neither of which was statistically more likely than the other across our
participants.

Figure 2.10 – figure supplement 1: Relationship between log likelihood difference for the
two strategies and age for the Sequential condition. Log likelihood comparison for AtD and
DtA (negative favors AtD) for set sizes 2 and 5 is not dependent upon age (correlation, ps>0.20
computed separately for each set size).
Figure 2.10 – figure supplement 1: Relationship between log likelihood difference for the two strategies and age for
the Sequential condition

Alternative models for Sequential conditions
Up to this point, we have considered the two extremes of either: 1) holding all
stimuli in memory until the time of the report (the DtA model), or 2) averaging all stimuli
as soon as possible and then holding only this single average in memory (the AtD model).
When set size is larger than two, it is possible to perform a hybrid of these strategies. For
example, one could diffuse the initial N–1 items until the final stimulus is presented and
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then combine all evidence at that point. Thus, we did an additional log likelihood
comparison using this hybrid model for set size 5 (note that AtD and this hybrid model are
identical for set size 2, and all models had the same number of parameters). We found that
3 participants previously identified as AtD and 3 participants previously identified as DtA
were slightly better described by the hybrid model (average LL difference for formerly
DtA participants=0.34, average difference from formerly AtD participants 1.28). This
finding is consistent with the idea that people likely use a spectrum of strategies, including
nuanced combinations of AtD-like and DtA-like dynamics (which were the focus of the
present study, to demonstrate how those dynamics can give rise to identifiable signatures
of behavioral errors) that warrant further consideration when building more detailed
models of memory-dependent decision-making.
Strategy comparisons across conditions
The use of different strategies (i.e., those captured by the AtD and DtA models) did
not appear to reflect a tendency of individual participants to use a particular strategy across
different conditions. Specifically, we used Fisher’s exact test of independence based on set
size across temporal conditions as well as based on temporal conditions across set sizes to
test whether individual participants were best fit by the same model under different task
conditions. We failed to reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between a
participant’s strategy use across set size for both Simultaneous and Sequential conditions
(i.e., strategy use in set size 2 Simultaneous was not predictive of use in set size 5
Simultaneous, nor was it for Sequential conditions; p=0.31 and p=1 respectively). We also
failed to reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between a participant’s
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strategy use across temporal conditions for both set sizes 2 and 5 (p=0.54 and p=1
respectively). Thus, we found that only under set size 5 were Simultaneous conditions
participants more likely to use one strategy (AtD) over the other (DtA). In all other tested
cases, participants were equally likely to use either strategy, and strategy use was not
predictive across conditions for individual participants.
Discussion
The goal of this study was to better understand if and how capacity and temporal
limitations of working memory affect human decision-making. We used a task that
required participants to report remembered spatial locations based on different numbers of
objects and for different delay durations, both of which are known to systematically affect
the precision of memory reports (Bastos et al., 2018; Cowan et al., 2008; Funahashi et al.,
1989; Oberauer et al., 2016; Panichello et al., 2019; Ploner et al., 1998; Schneegans &
Bays, 2018; White et al., 1994). We used two pairs of conditions to investigate these effects
across decision-making circumstances. The first condition was Perceptual versus
Computed, which allowed us to recapitulate previous findings of the effects of capacity
and temporal limitations of working memory for directly observed (perceptual) quantities
and then extend those findings to the kind of computed quantity that is used as a decision
variable for tasks that require integration or averaging to reduce uncertainty (Brody &
Hanks, 2016; Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Ratcliff et al., 2016; Shadlen & Shohamy, 2016;
Summerfield & Tsetsos, 2012). The second was Simultaneous versus Sequential
conditions, which extended our investigation to include the effects of working-memory
limitations on decision-making under relatively simple conditions (i.e., when all relevant
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evidence was presented at once) to the effects in a basic case of evidence accumulation
over time (i.e., in which a new piece of evidence is used to update a computed quantity).
Our primary finding was that computed variables based on either simultaneously
or sequentially presented information were susceptible to the same kinds of workingmemory constraints as perceived variables. These working-memory limitations
corresponded to a decrease in precision over time, which places critical constraints on the
kinds of decision variables that are required to persist over time, such as when decisions
are delayed. Specifically, the variability caused by singular events such as sensory
encoding or averaging tended to be ~10 in Simultaneous conditions, whereas noise
accumulating during memory delay periods was typically ~3.5/sec. Therefore, after ~3
sec, the noise that can be attributed to memory versus non-memory sources is about equal,
and after this point memory noise begins to dominate overall variability. This result appears
to contradict previous findings that found no effect of extra delays on the effectiveness of
evidence accumulation for certain decisions (Liu et al., 2015; Waskom & Kiani, 2018).
However, those studies used tasks with binary choices that required decision variables with
less clear sensitivity to the kinds of working-memory effects we found in the context of a
continuous, spatially based decision variable. Additionally, we found that increasing the
number of decision-relevant items also decreased the accuracy of the continuous decision
variable, although the nature of this effect was variable. More work is needed to fully
characterize the conditions under which temporal and capacity limitations on the precision
of working-memory representations affect decisions based on those representations.
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We also found that the exact nature of interactions between working-memory
limitations and decision-making depend critically on the strategy used to form the decision,
and those strategies can vary substantially across individuals and tasks. For our tasks, we
focused on two primary strategies. The first strategy, captured by the Average-then-Diffuse
(AtD) model, stipulated that a participant first calculates and then stores the Computed
value. Its key prediction is that a Computed value should be susceptible to the same effects
of working-memory limitations as a single remembered Perceptual value in simultaneous
conditions. The second strategy, captured by the Diffuse-then-Average (DtA) model,
stipulated that all individual values are stored in working memory until the time of decision.
Its key prediction is that the overall rate of variance increase is inversely related to the
number of items. Although the differences in performance of adopters of each of the
strategies was often minimal in the present study, the differences in strategy rely on rates
of degradation over time and thus performance differences would be expected to grow over
longer delays. We found that participants tended to use an AtD strategy for the
Simultaneous conditions with a relatively high load (five items), but otherwise were
roughly equally likely to use either strategy, including for all Sequential conditions.
This finding of multiple strategy use raises several intriguing future questions. For
example, we found that for the Simultaneous condition, several individuals switched from
using DtA for the smaller set size to AtD for the larger set size, but we do not know if this
switch was a consequence of their personal working-memory capacities. From an
optimality standpoint, DtA better preserves a computed value compared to AtD for a given
level of non-time-dependent noise and cost per storage item (A), but only if A remains low

79

(<1). It would be interesting to see if for more intermediate set sizes (i.e., 3 or 4 items)
there is a reliable increase in the probability of a participant using AtD with a progression
that relates to other measures of the individual’s working-memory capacity. Such future
studies would more definitively support the conclusion that increased working-memory
load corresponds to an increased tendency to discard information about individual samples
and hold only the computed decision variable in memory. Future studies should also
examine other factors that might govern which strategy is used for a given set of conditions.
For example, participants in our study were instructed to report the average but given no
additional details about how to do so, nor given strong incentives for choosing any
particular strategy versus another. Future studies could provide more detailed instructions,
incentives, and/or feedback to better understand the flexibility with which these different
strategies can be employed.
Future work should also examine in more detail several other facets of working
memory that were not included in our models but in principle could affect decision
variables that are computed and retained over time. First, we did not consider possible
differences in metabolic energy and other resources needed to implement the different
working-memory demands of different strategies (van den Berg & Ma, 2018). Future
studies of strategy heterogeneity may need to consider how different strategies minimize
both response errors and execution costs. Second, our DtA model assumed no interference
between multiple items stored in memory. This assumption is undoubtedly an
oversimplification, given that storage of multiple items has been both hypothesized and
shown to create attraction and repulsion (Almeida et al., 2015; Krishnan et al., 2018; Wei
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et al., 2012). Such directional drift can create a decrease in variance over time that could
affect decision variables that involve multiple quantities stored at once. Third, our DtA
model also assumed that each item was stored individually. Alternatively, items could have
been discarded or merged (chunked) (Krishnan et al., 2018; Wei et al., 2012), leading to
different memory loads which could also affect performance. Fourth, most of our
participants used strategies that were well described by the AtD or DtA model. However,
under certain conditions (i.e., Sequential, set size 5) some participants seemed to use hybrid
strategies. This kind of strategy would suggest extensive flexibility in when and how
evidence is incorporated into computed decision variables, thereby placing potentially
complex demands on working memory.
Both of our primary models were based on assumptions of a drifting memory
representation. This random drift is traditionally associated with attractor models of
working memory (Bays, 2014; Compte, 2000; Macoveanu et al., 2007; Wei et al., 2012)
that have been used extensively to describe the underlying neural mechanisms (Funahashi
et al., 1989; Shafi et al., 2007; Takeda & Funahashi, 2002; Wimmer et al., 2014). In these
models, neural network activity is induced by an external stimulus and then maintained via
excitatory connections of similarly tuned neurons and long-ranged inhibition. Random
noise causes the center of this activity (which represents the stimulus) to drift in a manner
that, dependent on the implementation, can depend on the delay duration, set size, and/or
their interaction (Almeida et al., 2015; Bays, 2014; Koyluoglu et al., 2017). A recent
implementation even can naturally compute a running average based on sequentially
presented information (Esnaola-Acebes et al., 2021). Our results imply that such models
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should be extended to support the flexible use of different strategies that govern when and
how incoming information is used to form such averages. It will be interesting to see if
such a flexible model can account for neural activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(dlPFC), which includes neurons with persistent activity that has been associated with both
spatial working memory (Compte, 2000; Constantinidis et al., 2018; Riley &
Constantinidis, 2015; Wei et al., 2012; Wimmer et al., 2014) and the formation of decisions
based on an accumulation of evidence (Curtis & D’Esposito, 2003; H. R. Heekeren et al.,
2006; Hauke R. Heekeren et al., 2008; Kim & Shadlen, 1999; Lin et al., 2020; Philiastides
et al., 2011).
In conclusion, we found that in this spatial, continuous task, participant accuracy
for both perceived and computed values was subject to working-memory limitations of
both time and capacity. Additionally, we found behavior that was consistent with both the
storage strategies we investigated. The fact that different participants employed different
strategies for storing a computed value (such as a decision variable) and that these
strategies have different consequences on overall accuracy has important implications for
not only future neural network models of working memory, but also for future
computational models of decision-making.
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Materials and Methods
Human psychophysics behavioral task
We tested 17 participants (4 male, 12 female, 1 chose not to answer; age range=22–
87 yrs). The task was created with PsychoPy3 (Peirce et al., 2019) and distributed to
participants via Pavlovia.com, which allowed participants to perform the task on their
home computers after providing informed consent. These protocols were reviewed by the
University of Pennsylvania Institutional Review Board (IRB) and determined to meet
eligibility criteria for IRB review exemption authorized by 45 CFR 46.104, category 2.
Participants were instructed to sit one arm-length away from their computer screens
during the experiment and to use the mouse to indicate choices. Each participant completed
1–2 sets of 4 blocks of trials in their own time.
The basic trial structure is illustrated in Fig. 2.1. Each trial began with the
presentation of a central white fixation cross (1% of the screen height). The participant was
instructed to maintain fixation on this cross when not actively responding. The participant
began each trial by placing the mouse over the cross and clicking, to allow for self-pacing
and pseudo-fixation. Initiating a trial caused a white annulus of radius 25% of the screen
height to appear. A block-specific memory array appeared 250 ms later, centered at an
angle chosen uniformly and at random on the anulus. The array consisted of 1, 2, or 5
colored disks sized 1.5% screen in diameter. The angular difference between any two
adjacent disks was at least 6°, and between the two most distal disks was at most 60°. The
disks from clockwise to counter-clockwise were always presented in the same order: green,
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red, blue, magenta, and yellow. When fewer than five disks were presented, the latter colors
were omitted. The consistent color ordering was intended to reduce errors caused by misbinding of location and color. The angular differences between disks in an array was
randomly selected from 5 preselected sets of 5 angular differences that obeyed the
restrictions stated above, centered on a randomly selected location on the circle. If set size
was < 5, later numbers were omitted. The sets were [-22, -11, -2, 7, 13], [-25, -4, 6, 12, 24],
[-30, -18, 3, 15, 29], [-22, -10, 0, 7, 17], and [-19, -12, 0, 9, 28] (numbers are degrees
clockwise relative to the randomly selected location on the circle).
The memory array remained on the screen for 0.5 s, while the annulus remained
on the screen throughout the delay of 0, 1, or 6 s. At the end of the delay, the fixation cross
was replaced with a response cue that either matched a color of a disk in the memory array,
indicating a response to the remembered location of that disk, or was white, indicating a
response to the mean angle of all disks in the present trial. The response type varied by
block (see below). The participant then moved the mouse and clicked on the annulus at a
position at which they remembered the requested response. Feedback was then given
indicating the correct location, the participant’s response, and the difference between the
two.
We used four block-wise conditions: 1) Simultaneous Perceived blocks used arrays
of 1, 2, or 5 disks presented simultaneously at the beginning of the trial. Participants were
told in advance that they would always be asked to report the location of one of the array
disks but were not informed which one until the response period. The probed disk was
picked randomly on each trial. 2) Simultaneous Computed blocks used arrays of 2 or 5
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disks presented simultaneously at the beginning of the trial. Participants were told in
advance they would need to report the average angle of all disks shown in the present trial.
3) Sequential Perceived blocks were identical to Simultaneous Perceived blocks, except
only arrays of 2 or 5 disks were used, and all but one of the disks (the counter-clockwise
most) was presented at the beginning of the trial. The final disk was presented for 0.5 s
ending midway through the delay of 1 or 6 s. The most counter-clockwise disk was always
the last presented disk, to make the task easier. Participants were told in advance that the
final disk would be presented in the middle of the delay for these blocks. 4) Sequential
Computed blocks were identical to Simultaneous Computed blocks, but with delayed
presentation of the final disk as in Sequential Perceived blocks. Again, participants were
told in advance that the final disk would be presented in the middle of the delay.
All participants completed one and most (12) participants completed two blocks of
each type. Each block contained 50 trials at each set size and each delay time, the order of
which was randomized.
Basic analyses
Trials were excluded from analysis if the response was >30° from the correct angle.
This cutoff was based on assessment of the error distributions (Figure 2.3 – figure
supplement 1, Figure 2.7 – figure supplement 1); using a cutoff of 25° did not noticeably
change the results. On average, <10% of trials were excluded per delay condition per set
size per block (see Figure 2.3 – figure supplement 1, Figure 2.7 – figure supplement 1).
These trials were excluded to focus analysis on trials that were directed towards the correct
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location and avoid lapses of attention and extreme motor errors. We investigated both the
bias and variance in participant responses, as follows.
We quantified bias as the mean error between the response and the true probed
angle for each participant and condition (positive/negative values imply errors that were
systematically counterclockwise/clockwise respectively). A Bonferroni-corrected twosided t-test was used to assess whether this mean response error was significantly different
from zero across participants for each set size, delay, response type and temporal
presentation. Additionally, the mean error and confidence interval for each participant were
calculated for each condition (Figure 2.3 – figure supplements 2 and 3; Figure 2.7 – figure
supplements 2 and 3). For the Sequential condition, we also assessed how bias Computed
responses were compared to the true mean location. We took the difference of the reported
mean from the Nth point and normalized this difference by the distance between the mean
of N–1 items and the Nth item. For set size 2, the true mean had a normalized value of 0.5.
For set size 5, the true mean had a normalized value of 0.8.
We quantified the variance of the error between the response and the true probed
angle for each participant and condition. We chose variance as opposed to other measures
of dispersion for consistency with our particle models (see below) in which variance scales
linearly with delay. We examined effects of set size, delay duration, and task context on
response variability using a two-way repeated measures ANOVA. On Simultaneous
Perceived and Computed blocks, we used a 3 (delay duration: 0, 1, or 6 s) x 3 (set size: 1,
2, or 5 disks) within-participant design. On Sequential Perceived blocks, we used a 2 (delay
duration: 1 or 6 s) x 3 (set size: 1, 2, or 5 disks) within-participants design for stimuli
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presented at the beginning of the trial (Early) and a 2 (delay: 0.5 or 3 s) x 2 (set size: 2 or
5 disks) design for stimuli presented halfway through the trial (Late). On Sequential
Computed blocks, we used a 2 (delay duration: 1 or 6 s) x 3 (set size: 1, 2, or 5 disks)
within-participants design. When the comparison included set size=1, data were always
taken from the Simultaneous Perceived block.
To assess performance differences based on strategy use, additional analyses were
performed once the data had been fit to the models and the best fit model had been selected
(see below). These analyses included an assessment of response error variability in the
Computed blocks using a 2 (model: AtD or DtA) x 3 or 2 (delay: 0 ,2, or 6 s Simultaneous
condition, 1 or 6 s for Sequential) ANOVA with multiple comparisons to identify
differences. To interrogate best fit parameter differences, two-sided t-tests were used to see
if the mean difference in best-fit parameter between AtD and DtA participants was
significantly different from zero for both Simultaneous and Sequential conditions. To
assess learning effects, a two-sided, paired t-test was used to see if the mean or standard
deviation of error responses in set size 5 Sequential conditions differed between the first
and second half of trials (we found no difference at either delay: for 1 sec delay p=0.67 and
0.11 for mean and standard deviation, respectively; for 6 sec delay p=0.75 and 0.98 for
mean and standard deviation, respectively).
Model-based analyses
Our models were based on principles of working memory that are well described
by bump-attractor network models (Compte, 2000; Laing & Chow, 2001; Wimmer et al.,
2014). In such models, stimulus location is represented by a “bump” in activity from
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neurons tuned to that and similar locations. These neurons recurrently activate each other,
maintaining a bump of activity even after stimulus cessation. However, because of the
stochastic nature of neural activity and synaptic transmission (Faisal et al., 2008), there is
variability in which neurons have the most activity at any given time (and thus are the
center of the bump representing the stimulus). This variability in bump center corresponds
to variability in the location representation and a degradation of the memory representation
over time. The dynamics of this bump can be described as a diffusion process that obeys
Brownian motion (Compte, 2000; Kilpatrick, 2018; Kilpatrick et al., 2013; Laing & Chow,
2001). We used this simplified description in our models as follows.
Perceived values in working memory
A single point (i.e., the central spatial location of a single disk), x1, is assumed to
be represented in working memory by 𝑥̂t,1, where t represents the time since the removal
of the stimulus. We assume that 𝑥̂t,1 evolves like a sample from a Brownian-motion process.
Specifically, when 𝑥1 is observed, it is encoded with some perceptual noise, ηp. Therefore,
at time zero, 𝑥̂ 0,1~ N(x, ηp). This representation accumulates noise over time with some
diffusion constant, σ12, further degrading the representation of 𝑥̂t,1 from x1 such that 𝑥̂t,1~
N(x1, ηp+ t*σ12). There is additional motor noise in the participant’s report, rt,1, and we
denote the variance of this motor noise by ηm. Mathematically, it is equivalent to add the
motor noise at the beginning or the end of the diffusion of 𝑥̂t,1 when considering the report,
rt,1. In our model, we thus represent the sum of the perceptual and motor noise as a single,
static noise term. Hence, we show simulated trajectories of 𝑥̂t,1 in Fig. 2.2a with an initial
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variance of η1= ηp+ ηm, so that at time t, the report rt,1 is the current angle of the trajectory.
Therefore:
rt,1 ~N(x1, η1 + t* σ12).

(1)

We used Gaussian rather than von Mises distributions because: 1) they are easier
to generalize to other, non-circular domains; 2) the Gaussian standard deviation parameter
has a more intuitive interpretation than the von Mises concentration parameter; and 3) our
stimuli were constrained to be a maximum of 60 apart, and thus the periodicity of the von
Mises distribution was unnecessary to capture the diffusion dynamics.
When multiple items are held in memory, they are held with less fidelity than a
single point (Bays et al., 2009; Brady & Alvarez, 2015; Koyluoglu et al., 2017; Wei et al.,
2012). We therefore assume that the sum of the initial perceptual noise and final motor
noise, with variance denoted by ηN, can depend on the number of disks, N. Moreover, we
describe, 𝑥̂t,n, the representation of the nth item at time t, by a normal distribution with a
diffusion constant that is potentially higher than for a single point. We assume that this new
diffusion constant σN2, equals σ12*NA and thus scales as a power of the total number of
stimuli, N, held in memory (Bays et al., 2009; Bays & Husain, 2008; Wei et al., 2012), and
is proportional to the diffusion constant corresponding to a single stimulus representation,
σ12. Therefore:
rt,n ~ N(xn, ηN + t* σ12*NA)

(2)

All representations in a set of size N share the same magnitude of non-timedependent noise, ηN, but the evolution of each representation is assumed to be independent.
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To examine distributions of responses across the various presented locations, we measured
the error of the response rt,n relative to the true location of the target the observer was asked
to report, xt,n. According to our model, the difference between the true and reported location
(the error, et,n) is
et,1 ~ N(0, η1 + t *σ12)

(3a)

et,n ~ N(0, ηN + t *σ12*NA)

(3b)

The linear relationship between total accumulated noise and time for both a single
and multiple memoranda is illustrated in Fig. 2.2b.
Average-then-Diffuse (AtD) Simultaneous model
For this model, the representation of the average is stored as a single particle that
diffuses the same as a Perceived item (i.e., a location at which there was a visible stimulus;
see Fig. 2.2b). Thus, the diffusion term for the representation of a computed average of N
items, σMN2, is also σ12. We do not assume that the representation of the average has the
same static noise as a single point, because there could be additional noise from
inaccurately averaging multiple items or conversely a reduction in overall noise resulting
from the averaging of multiple random variables (the constituent items). We denote the
variance of the static noise for the Computed mean by ηMN. The difference between the true
mean of N stimuli and the mean reported at time t is therefore:
et,mN, AtD ~ N(0, ηMNAtD + t*σ12)
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(4)

Diffuse-then-Average (DtA) Simultaneous model
For this model, the individual perceived items are stored as individual,
independently diffusing particles and then averaged at the end of the trial. Thus, the
diffusion constant of the Computed value is the variance of the average of N random
variables each with the diffusion constant σ12*NA, resulting in an effective diffusion
constant for the Computed value of σMN2=σ12*NA/N, where the division by 𝑁 arises from
averaging. Again, we allow for a free non-time-dependent-noise term because of the
uncertain effects of the averaging calculation itself. For this model, the error in the reported
location at time t of the average of the mean, M, of N items, et,MN, is:
et,mN, DtA~ N(0, ηMNDtA + t*σ12*NA/N)

(5)

If A=1, the AtD and DtA models are identical. We thus used best-fitting values of
A to help assess model distinguishability for each participant and task condition (see Figure
2.2 – figure supplement 1; Figure 2.4 – figure supplement 1, Figure 2.8 – figure supplement
1). If A<1, then the DtA strategy results in a lower diffusion constant for a Computed value
than predicted by the AtD model and results in a smaller average variance in reporting error
(see Fig. 2.2c). If A>1, then AtD results in the lower diffusion constant and thus a lower
average variance in reporting error. However, given the parameter estimates obtained in
this study, we did not find that participants necessarily used the strategy that would result
in the lowest response variability.
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Sequentially presented values in working memory
In the Sequential blocks, N–1 items were presented immediately (Early items), and
the Nth item was presented halfway through the delay (Late item). Therefore, both models
assume that the diffusion constant for the representation of the N–1 early items increases
with the addition of the Nth item, corresponding to the increased memory load. The
representation of the Late item then diffuses for only half of the delay time, T (see Fig.
2.2d,e). We formalized this process with the following model for the report error of the
Early (eT,NE) and Late (eT,NL) items:
eT,NE ~ N(0, ηNE + T/2* σ12*(N-1)A+ T/2* σ12*NA)

(6a)

eT,NL ~ N(0, ηNL + T/2* σ12*NA)

(6b)

Here T is the total time of the delay, and we assumed different non-time-dependent
noise for both Early and Late items (ηNE and ηNL, respectively).
AtD Sequential model
This model assumes that the Early items are averaged immediately and stored as a
single item. At t=T/2, the Late item is presented and combined immediately, through
appropriate weighted averaging, with the mean of the Early items. This new mean again
diffuses with the same accumulating noise as a single item (see Fig. 2.2d). Therefore:
eT,MN-seqAtD ~ N(0, ηMN-SeqAtD + ((N-1)/N)2*T/2* σ12 + T/2* σ12)

(7)

At t=T/2, the representation of the Nth item has not accumulated any diffusion noise
and only has non-time-dependent noise, which is absorbed in the ηMN-Seq term. The first
time-dependent term, ((N-1)/N)2*T/2* σ12, results from the appropriate weighted averaging
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of the mean of the Early items (time-dependent noise of T/2* σ12) with the Late item (timedependent noise=0). The final term, T/2* σ12, is the diffusion of the resultant mean until
the end of the delay.
DtA Sequential model
This model assumes that the representations of all N items diffuse as they are
presented, resulting in N–1 items described by eq. 6a and one item described by eq. 6b.
These items are then averaged at the end of the delay, resulting in an overall error of:
eT,MN-seqDtA ~ N(0, ηMN-SeqDtA + ( T/2*σ12*NA +…
(N-1) [ T/2* σ12*(N-1)A + T/2* σ12*NA] )/N2)

(8)

where the constant noise terms from the Early and Late items are absorbed in the ηMN-SeqDtA
term, the next term T/2*σ12*N. is the diffusion in the representation of the last disk shown,
and the remaining terms arise from the first N–1 items shown. The effect of this averaging
on the effective diffusion constant are shown in Fig. 2.2e.
Alternative model
A third model was considered for Sequential set size 5 conditions: the first N–1
items diffused until the Nth point was presented, at which point all items were averaged and
this average diffused for the remainder of the delay. Thus, eT,MN-seqDtA ~ N(ηMN_SeqAlt + (N–
1)*(T/2* σ12*( N–1)A)/N2 + T/2 * σ12 ).
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Model fitting
The AtD and DtA models were fit to data from the Simultaneous Perceived and
Computed blocks using 5 free parameters: 1) the static noise of a single point (η1), 2) the
diffusion noise of a single point (σ12), 3) the static noise of N items (ηN), 4) the exponent of
storing N items (A), and 5) the static noise of the mean (ηMN(AtD or DtA)). We fit these models
for N=2 and N=5 conditions separately, using trials from the following conditions.
Perceived: delays 1, 3, and 6 s; array sizes 1 (eq. 3a) and N (eq. 3b). Computed: delays 1,
3, and 6 s; array size N (eq. 4 for AtD, eq. 5 for DtA). To validate the assumption that the
cost of storing additional items (A) was constant between Perceived and Computed blocks
for DtA fit participants, we re-fit the models using trials from only Perceived or only
Computed trials. The difference in the best fit A values were compared across participants
using a two-sided t-test for mean difference=0.
The AtD and DtA models were fit to data from the Sequential Perceived and
Computed blocks using 6 free parameters. The additional parameter accounted for
differences in the static noise for Early and Late items. We fit these models for N=2 and
N=5 conditions separately, using trials from the following conditions. Perceived: delays 1,
3, and 6 s; array size 1 (eq. 3a). Perceived: delays 3 and 6 s, array size N for both Early (eq.
6a) and Late (eq. 6b) items. Computed: delays 3 and 6 s, array size N (eq. 7 for AtD or eq.
8 for DtA).
Because the mean error for each individual participant was not always zero, when
fitting the AtD and DtA models we used the empirical mean error from the condition being
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fitted as a fixed bias term in the model. Mean error and confidence intervals for each
participant for each condition are shown in Figure 2.3 – figure supplements 2 and 3; Figure
2.7 – figure supplements 2 and 3.
We obtained separate maximum-likelihood fits for AtD and DtA models for each
individual participant, using the function fmincon in MATLAB to minimize the summed
negative log likelihood of obtaining the observed errors for a given condition according to
the above equations. Initial parameter values were randomized and the fitting repeated to
avoid local minima. Because all models within a given condition had the same number of
parameters, we compared log likelihoods to determine the best-fitting model for a given
participant. Because the number of parameters is the same, comparing likelihoods produces
equivalent model selection to BIC or AIC.
Assessing model assumption and identifiability
To assess how well each participant’s data matched the assumptions of the AtD and
DtA models, we also fit a line to the variances of response errors across delays for a given
condition for a given participant to obtain empirical estimates of the various diffusion
constants (e.g., slope of lines in Fig. 2.2b; empirical estimate of a Perceived value, 𝜎̂N2, for
set size N; empirical estimate of a Computed value, 𝜎̂MN2, set size N). These empirical
estimates of the diffusion constants did not enforce the relationships imposed by the AtD
and DtA models between the different diffusion constants in each model respectively. We
compared the relationships of these empirical estimates of diffusion constants to the
relationships assumed by our models, as follows:
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AtD Simultaneous
The Computed mean diffuses with the same diffusion constant as a single value. Thus:
𝜎12 - 𝜎MN2=0

(9)

DtA Simultaneous
The Computed mean is the average of N items each diffusing with a constant of σN2. Thus:
𝜎N2/N - 𝜎MN2=0

(10)

AtD Sequential
The time-dependent noise has variance that increases as ((N-1)/N)2*T/2* σ12 + T/2* σ12)
(eq. 7). Factoring out T gives the diffusion constant for the Computed mean, σMN2= [(N–
1)2+N2]/(2N2)* 𝜎12. Thus:
[(N–1)2+N2]/(2N2)* 𝜎12–σMN2=0

(11)

DtA Sequential
The time-dependent noise has variance that increases as T/2*σ12*NA + (N–1) [ T/2* σ12*(N–
1)A + T/2* σ12*NA])/N2 (eq. 8). By eq. 6a, the diffusion constant for an Early Perceived
point, σNE2, is [0.5* σ12*(N–1)A + 0.5* σ12*NA] and by eq. 6b, the diffusion constant for a
Late Perceived point, σNL2, is σ12*NA. Factoring out T and substituting gives the diffusion
constant for the Computed mean, σMN2= (0.5σNL2+(N–1)* σNE2)/N2. Thus:
(0.5*σNL2+(N–1)* σNE2)/N2–σMN2=0

(12)

To assess how well the relationships between participant empirical estimates of the
diffusion constants matched these assumptions, for each participant we simulated 1000
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iterations of a participant performing the task using the best-fit model for the given true
participant and the maximum likelihood estimate parameters for that participant. We then
estimated the empirical diffusion constants for each of these iterations in the same way that
we did for our participants, namely by fitting a line to the measured variance of the
simulated errors across delays, for each condition and iteration. Our 1000 simulations gave
us an expected range around the expected diffusion constant relationships detailed in eq.
9–12 to compare to our participants’ empirical diffusion constant relationships.
Participants whose empirical diffusion constant relationships fell within the central 95% of
the simulated expected range were considered well fit by their model.
To assess model identifiability, for each participant and condition we fit both models
to the results of each of set of 1000 simulations generated using the best-fitting parameters
from the best-fitting model for that participant and condition. We used the log-likelihoods
to determine the best model for each simulation and determined the percentage of correctly
identified models. We used these results to further assess the reliability of our analyses of
strategy prevalence across the population of participants, as follows. For each condition
(Simultaneous versus Sequential and set size 2 versus 5), we determined an empirical
proportion of AtD versus DtA prevalence (i.e., in terms of the relative numbers of
participants whose data were best fit by the two models). We then sampled from a binomial
distribution 10,000 times using a range of possible proportions between 0 and 1 in 1/34th
increments. Each iteration yielded a simulated proportion, which we then adjusted with our
model-identifiability results: each simulated AtD participant had a chance of being
misidentified according to average percent correctly identified for that model as determined
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above, and likewise with DtA. The proportion of samples that matched our data were used
to create the probability obtaining our observed results, given possible underlying
proportions and average model identifiability (Fig. 2.6b, 2.10b).

98

References
Almeida, R., Barbosa, J., & Compte, A. (2015). Neural circuit basis of visuo-spatial
working memory precision: a computational and behavioral study. Journal of
Neurophysiology, 114(3), 1806–1818. https://doi.org/10.1152/jn.00362.2015
Bastos, A. M., Loonis, R., Kornblith, S., Lundqvist, M., & Miller, E. K. (2018). Laminar
recordings in frontal cortex suggest distinct layers for maintenance and control of
working memory. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United
States of America, 115(5), 1117–1122. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1710323115
Bays, P. M. (2014). Noise in neural populations accounts for errors in working memory.
The Journal of Neuroscience : The Official Journal of the Society for Neuroscience,
34(10), 3632–3645. https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3204-13.2014
Bays, P. M., Catalao, R. F. G., & Husain, M. (2009). The precision of visual working
memory is set by allocation of a shared resource. Journal of Vision, 9(10), 7.1-11.
https://doi.org/10.1167/9.10.7
Bays, P. M., & Husain, M. (2008). Dynamic shifts of limited working memory resources
in

human

vision.

Science

(New

York,

N.Y.),

321(5890),

851–854.

https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1158023
Bernacchia, A., Seo, H., Lee, D., & Wang, X. J. (2011). A reservoir of time constants for
memory traces in cortical neurons. Nature Neuroscience, 14(3), 366–372.
https://doi.org/10.1038/nn.2752

99

Brady, T. F., & Alvarez, G. A. (2015). Contextual effects in visual working memory reveal
hierarchically structured memory representations. Journal of Vision, 15(15), 6.
https://doi.org/10.1167/15.15.6
Brody, C. D., & Hanks, T. D. (2016). Neural underpinnings of the evidence accumulator.
In Current Opinion in Neurobiology (Vol. 37, pp. 149–157). Elsevier Ltd.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.conb.2016.01.003
Compte, A. (2000). Synaptic Mechanisms and Network Dynamics Underlying Spatial
Working Memory in a Cortical Network Model. Cerebral Cortex, 10(9), 910–923.
https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/10.9.910
Constantinidis, C., Funahashi, S., Lee, D., Murray, J. D., Qi, X.-L., Wang, M., & Arnsten,
A. F. T. (2018). Persistent Spiking Activity Underlies Working Memory. The Journal
of Neuroscience : The Official Journal of the Society for Neuroscience, 38(32), 7020–
7028. https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2486-17.2018
Cowan, N., Morey, C. C., Chen, Z., Gilchrist, A. L., & Saults, J. S. (2008). Theory and
Measurement of Working Memory Capacity Limits. In Psychology of Learning and
Motivation - Advances in Research and Theory (Vol. 49, pp. 49–104). Academic Press.
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0079-7421(08)00002-9
Curtis, C. E., & D’Esposito, M. (2003). Persistent activity in the prefrontal cortex during
working memory. In Trends in Cognitive Sciences (Vol. 7, Issue 9, pp. 415–423).
Elsevier Ltd. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00197-9

100

Esnaola-Acebes, J. M., Roxin, A., & Wimmer, K. (2021). Bump attractor dynamics
underlying

stimulus

integration

in

perceptual

estimation

tasks.

BioRxiv,

2021.03.15.434192. https://doi.org/10.1101/2021.03.15.434192
Faisal, A. A., Selen, L. P. J., & Wolpert, D. M. (2008). Noise in the nervous system. In
Nature Reviews Neuroscience (Vol. 9, Issue 4, pp. 292–303). Nature Publishing Group.
https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn2258
Funahashi, S., Bruce, C. J., & Goldman-Rakic, P. S. (1989). Mnemonic Coding of Visual
Space

in

the

Monkey’s

Dorsolateral

JOURNALOFNEUROPHYSIOLOGY

Prefrontal

(Vol.

6,

Cortex.
Issue

In
2).

www.physiology.org/journal/jn
Gold, J. I., & Shadlen, M. N. (2007). The neural basis of decision making. In Annual
Review

of

Neuroscience

(Vol.

30,

pp.

535–574).

Annual

Reviews.

https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.neuro.29.051605.113038
Gold, J. I., & Stocker, A. A. (2017). Visual Decision-Making in an Uncertain and Dynamic
World. In Annual Review of Vision Science (Vol. 3, pp. 227–250). Annual Reviews
Inc. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-vision-111815-114511
Heekeren, H. R., Marrett, S., Ruff, D. A., Bandettini, P. A., & Ungerleider, L. G. (2006).
Involvement of human left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in perceptual decision making
is independent of response modality. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
of

the

United

States

of

101

America,

103(26),

10023–10028.

https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0603949103
Heekeren, Hauke R., Marrett, S., & Ungerleider, L. G. (2008). The neural systems that
mediate human perceptual decision making. In Nature Reviews Neuroscience (Vol. 9,
Issue 6, pp. 467–479). Nature Publishing Group. https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn2374
Kilpatrick, Z. P. (2018). Synaptic mechanisms of interference in working memory.
Scientific Reports, 8(1), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-018-25958-9
Kilpatrick, Z. P., Ermentrout, B., & Doiron, B. (2013). Optimizing working memory with
heterogeneity of recurrent cortical excitation. The Journal of Neuroscience : The
Official Journal of the Society for

Neuroscience, 33(48), 18999–19011.

https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1641-13.2013
Kim, J. N., & Shadlen, M. N. (1999). Neural correlates of a decision in the dorsolateral
prefrontal

cortex

of

the

macaque.

Nature

Neuroscience,

2(2),

176–185.

https://doi.org/10.1038/5739
Koyluoglu, O. O., Pertzov, Y., Manohar, S., Husain, M., & Fiete, I. R. (2017). Fundamental
bound on the persistence and capacity of short-term memory stored as graded persistent
activity. ELife, 6. https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.22225
Krishnan, N., Poll, D. B., & Kilpatrick, Z. P. (2018). Synaptic efficacy shapes resource
limitations in working memory. Journal of Computational Neuroscience, 44(3), 273–
295. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10827-018-0679-7
Laing, C. R., & Chow, C. C. (2001). Stationary bumps in networks of spiking neurons.
102

Neural

Computation,

13(7),

1473–1494.

https://doi.org/10.1162/089976601750264974
Lin, Z., Nie, C., Zhang, Y., Chen, Y., & Yang, T. (2020). Evidence accumulation for value
computation in the prefrontal cortex during decision making. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 117(48), 30728–30737.
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2019077117
Liu, A. S. K., Tsunada, J., Gold, J. I., & Cohen, Y. E. (2015). Temporal integration of
auditory information is invariant to temporal grouping cues. ENeuro, 2(2).
https://doi.org/10.1523/ENEURO.0077-14.2015
Macoveanu, J., Klingberg, T., Tegnér, J., Macoveanu, J., Tegnér, · J, Klingberg, T., &
Tegnér, J. (2007). Neuronal firing rates account for distractor effects on mnemonic
accuracy in a visuo-spatial working memory task. Biol Cybern, 96, 407–419.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00422-006-0139-8
Oberauer, K., Farrell, S., Jarrold, C., & Lewandowsky, S. (2016). What limits working
memory

capacity?

Psychological

Bulletin,

142(7),

758–799.

https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000046
Panichello, M. F., DePasquale, B., Pillow, J. W., & Buschman, T. J. (2019). Errorcorrecting dynamics in visual working memory. Nature Communications, 10(1), 3366.
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-019-11298-3
Peirce, J., Gray, J. R., Simpson, S., MacAskill, M., Höchenberger, R., Sogo, H., Kastman,

103

E., & Lindeløv, J. K. (2019). PsychoPy2: Experiments in behavior made easy. Behavior
Research Methods, 51(1), 195–203. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13428-018-01193-y
Philiastides, M. G., Auksztulewicz, R., Heekeren, H. R., & Blankenburg, F. (2011). Causal
role of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in human perceptual decision making. Current
Biology, 21(11), 980–983. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2011.04.034
Ploner, C. J., Gaymard, B., Rivaud, S., Agid, Y., & Pierrot-Deseilligny, C. (1998).
Temporal limits of spatial working memory in humans. European Journal of
Neuroscience, 10(2), 794–797. https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1460-9568.1998.00101.x
Ratcliff, R., Smith, P. L., Brown, S. D., & McKoon, G. (2016). Diffusion Decision Model:
Current Issues and History. In Trends in Cognitive Sciences (Vol. 20, Issue 4, pp. 260–
281). Elsevier Ltd. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2016.01.007
Riley, M. R., & Constantinidis, C. (2015). Role of Prefrontal Persistent Activity in
Working

Memory.

Frontiers

in

Systems

Neuroscience,

9,

181.

https://doi.org/10.3389/fnsys.2015.00181
Schneegans, S., & Bays, P. M. (2018). Drift in Neural Population Activity Causes Working
Memory to Deteriorate Over Time. The Journal of Neuroscience : The Official Journal
of

the

Society

for

Neuroscience,

38(21),

4859–4869.

https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3440-17.2018
Shadlen, M. N. N., & Shohamy, D. (2016). Decision Making and Sequential Sampling
from Memory. In Neuron (Vol. 90, Issue 5, pp. 927–939). Cell Press.

104

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2016.04.036
Shafi, M., Zhou, Y., Quintana, J., Chow, C., Fuster, J., & Bodner, M. (2007). Variability
in neuronal activity in primate cortex during working memory tasks. Neuroscience,
146(3), 1082–1108. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.NEUROSCIENCE.2006.12.072
Summerfield, C., & Tsetsos, K. (2012). Building bridges between perceptual and economic
decision-making: Neural and computational mechanisms. In Frontiers in Neuroscience
(Vol. 6, Issue MAY). Front Neurosci. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnins.2012.00070
Takeda, K., & Funahashi, S. (2002). Prefrontal Task-Related Activity Representing Visual
Cue Location or Saccade Direction in Spatial Working Memory Tasks.
https://doi.org/10.1152/jn.00249.2001
van den Berg, R., & Ma, W. J. (2018). A resource-rational theory of set size effects in
human visual working memory. ELife, 7. https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.34963
Waskom, M. L., & Kiani, R. (2018). Decision Making through Integration of Sensory
Evidence

at

Prolonged

Timescales.

Current

Biology,

1–7.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2018.10.021
Wei, Z., Wang, X.-J., & Wang, D.-H. (2012). From Distributed Resources to Limited Slots
in Multiple-Item Working Memory: A Spiking Network Model with Normalization.
Journal

of

Neuroscience,

32(33),

11228–11240.

https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0735-12.2012
White, J. M., Sparks, D. L., & Stanford, T. R. (1994). Saccades to remembered target
105

locations: an analysis of systematic and variable errors. Vision Research, 34(1), 79–92.
https://doi.org/10.1016/0042-6989(94)90259-3
Wimmer, K., Nykamp, D. Q., Constantinidis, C., & Compte, A. (2014). Bump attractor
dynamics in prefrontal cortex explains behavioral precision in spatial working memory.
Nature Neuroscience, 17(3), 431–439. https://doi.org/10.1038/nn.3645

106

CHAPTER 3: THE INVESTIGATING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
TUNING PROPERTIES OF DLPFC NEURONS AND BEHAVIOR IN AN
ADAPTIVE OCULOMOTOR DELAYED RESPONSE TASK
Introduction
Optimal decision making not only requires the integration of multiple pieces of
(often ambiguous) evidence, but also the consideration of prior environmental information.
For example, when deciding which candidate to accept for a job in finance, one might look
at their grades from several classes (evidence) and consider the grades in the context of
what school the candidate attended (prior). The different classes may have different impact
on the ultimate decision to hire (grades in art class being less relevant than grades in
mathematics), and the school colors the interpretation of the grades (grades from MIT may
be more meaningful than from RISD). Optimal decision making in stable environments
requires perfect integration of the evidence (Brody & Hanks, 2016; Gold & Shadlen, 2007;
Wald & Wolfowitz, 1947), but when the ground truth is changeable, past irrelevant
evidence should be discarded. For example, when deciding how the country is fairing, if
an inauguration has recently occurred one should discount the happenings of the previous
regime. Sometimes it is difficult to tell when such a change point has occurred; in such
cases, one must temper integration with the possibility that a change has happened. The
optimal approach for how to interpret evidence in such unstable environments has been
described by previous studies (Glaze et al., 2015, 2018); essentially, one discounts previous
information proportionally to how relevant one considers it likely to be to the present state
of the world.
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How such interpretation of evidence according to environmental conditions is
implemented by the brain is still unknown. However, at least with regards to perceptual
spatial decisions, the mechanism is likely to involve the activity of the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). As elaborated in the introductory chapter of this thesis, the
dlFPC is thought to have a role in both working memory and decision making, particularly
for spatial tasks. Cells in this area of the brain have been found to have activity that
represents spatial stimuli after the spatial stimuli have been removed (Shintaro Funahashi
et al., 1989; P. S. Goldman-Rakic, 1995). The neurons have been hypothesized to be
connected in a bump-attractor architecture whose activity diffusion determines reported
errors (Compte, 2000). Analysis of the activity of a population of such neurons has revealed
that the representation ‘in mind’ shifts not only with a random diffusion, but also according
to task demands. In a task where a monkey had to make a saccade to a target 90° to the
right of a visual cue, the decoded dlPFC population response began with neurons
representing the original cue and shifted towards neurons representing the final response
location (S. Funahashi, 2006; Takeda & Funahashi, 2002).
The dlPFC is also likely to be sensitive to changes in environment. To reiterate the
introduction to this thesis, the dlPFC has extensive connections with LC (main source of
cortical norephinephrine; NE), and the working-memory related activity of dlPFC cells is
affected by NE (Amy F.T. Arnsten, 2000; Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005; Franowicz et al.,
2002; Ramos & Arnsten, 2007; M. Wang et al., 2007). Pupil activity (a proxy for locus
coeruleus (LC) activity: Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005; Joshi et al., 2016), has been shown
to correlate with change point probability and evidence relevance in a task requiring
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evidence integration in unstable environments (Krishnamurthy et al., 2017; Nassar et al.,
2012). Therefore, the dlPFC is likely to be involved in tasks which require the
interpretation of spatial evidence in the context of changing environments.
This project aims to discover whether the activity of memory-related dlPFC reflects
the change in interpretation of evidence due to stability-related priors. To investigate this
question we had monkeys perform an adaptive Oculomotor Delayed Response task
(aODR) in which they had to interpret which of two targets was correct based upon the
proximity of a memory cue. The probability that a target would stay correct over multiple
trials was governed by a block-wise probability of switch (hazard rate). In order to succeed
in the task, the monkeys had to interoperate sensory evidence with priors about switch
probability. We aim to find out whether dlPFC memory-related activity to a given spatial
cue shifts with hazard rate context and reward history to reflect the differing interpretations
of identical cues under the different contexts. The project is ongoing due to several
behavioral and technical complications, but the remainder of the chapter will detail the
methods and analyses performed thus far, preliminary conclusions, future directions and
modifications to the project.
Methods
Subjects
Two adult male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) were used for this study. All
training, surgery, and experimental procedures complied with the National Institute of
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Health’s Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals and were approved by the
University of Pennsylvania Institutional Care and Use Committee.
Behavioral Tasks
Oculomotor Delayed Response (ODR) Task
The goal of the ODR task was to determine baseline spatial tuning properties of
recording cells. Each trial began with presentation of a central fixation point which the
monkey had 500 ms to acquire. A cue was then presented at radius 10° visual angle for 50
ms. The cue either disappeared (Memory Guided) or was left on the screen (Visually
Guided) for 1 sec, after which the fixation point turned off (Memory/Visual monkey
dependent). The monkey then saccaded to the cue location and was rewarded (Fig 3.1)
Adaptive Oculomotor Delayed Response Task (aODR):
The goal of the adaptive oculomotor delayed response task was for the monkey to
attempt to select the correct target on a given trial by integrating context information and
presented evidence about the likelihood of a target being correct. Its design was adapted
from the triangles task of Glaze et al., 2015. Each trial began with the presentation of a
central fixation point, to which the monkey had 500 ms to acquire fixation. The color of
the fixation point represented the context of the task, namely, how likely the correct choice
from the previous trial would remain the correct choice. The two contexts were either a
neutral hazard rate (red, H= 0.5) or low hazard rate (white, H=0.05). Upon acquiring
fixation, a yellow cue was presented (radius 10° visual angle), the location of which was
chosen from a distribution based on which of the two upcoming targets (located at 45°
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above and below the horizontal, contralateral to the recorded hemisphere of the monkey)
was correct for the given trial. The cue could appear in 9° increments spanning between
the two possible targets. The probability that a cue was selected given a correct target is
illustrated in Fig. 3.1b. The cue was presented for 30ms, after which there was a delay of
1 sec. At the end of this delay the fixation point turned off and the two cues appeared. The
monkey indicated his choice by saccading to one of the two targets (Fig 3.1a). Monkeys
were given a large reward for correct choices, small rewards for incorrect choices, and a
bonus reward if their choice was consistent with the context information but inconsistent
with the cue evidence in the case of the low hazard rate condition. Reward sizes were
adjusted based on monkey motivation.
Eye position was monitored using Eye-Link 2000; SR Research sampled at 1000
Hz. Visual stimuli were generated using Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997) and custom Matlab
software. The stimuli were presented on an LCD monitor located 60 cm from the monkey’s
eyes.
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Figure 3.1: Task design

Figure 3.1: Task design. a) Top: ODR task. Bottom: aODR task. Crosses represent
possible cue locations. Each task has a fixation period, a visual period where the cue is
displayed, a memory period, a motor period where the target is selected via saccade, and
a reward period. b) Probability of cue location given correct target for aODR. Left:
Distribution for monkey Ci. Right: Distribution for monkey MM. The probability of the
center cue (cue location 5) is equal regardless of which target is correct. Crosses represent
possible locations of cues.
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Electrophysiology
Each monkey was implanted with a head holder and a recording cylinder.
Monkey MM had a cylinder on the left sides targeting the VL and dlPFC (Brodmann’s
area 45 and 46) and monkey Ci had a cylinder on the right side targeting the Acc
(Horsley-Clarke coordinates 33 mm anterior-posterior (AP), 8 mm lateral (L)). The
majority of the recordings at the time of writing were from Ci. The placement of Ci’s
chamber was such that access to the dlPFC, Brodmann’s area 46, was plausible according
to MRI scans. Recording depth spanned from 2-6 mm below the cortical surface.
Recordings were conducted using either single contact glass-coated tungsten electrodes
with impedances ranging from 0.8 to 2 MΩ (Alpha-Omega) or multicontact linear
electrode arrays (S-probe, Plexon) through a Multi-Channel Acquisition System (Plexon).
Spike waveforms were sorted by hand offline.
Behavioral Analyses
Monkey performance on the task was assessed with two methods, each based off
whether the monkey chose to switch targets from the previous correct and how much
evidence was given by the cues in favor of switching choices. For each possible evidence
of a switch, the probability of the monkey making a switch was calculated from the number
of trials in which the monkey switched over the total number of trials. These data were then
fit with a logistic function to determine bias, lapse, and noise. The bias term described what
level of evidence corresponded to the monkey switching responses 50% of the time. For
the neutral hazard rate, this bias was expected to approximate zero and for the low hazard
rate, understanding of task structure would lead to a positive bias term; thus the bias
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reflected the monkey’s understanding of context (Fig 3.2b). Lapse rate described how often
the monkey chose to make the suboptimal choice when the evidence strongly favored one
option (e.g. chose to switch even if the cue indicated the correct target remained the same
as the previous trial), and is a marker of the monkey’s attentiveness and understanding of
the relationship between cue evidence and correct target (Fig 3.2a). For each session, a bias
and lapse term were calculated to assess the monkey’s behavioral performance on a given
day (Fig 3.2 c-h).
The second method of behavioral assessment involved fitting the choices to the
normative model of (Glaze et al., 2015). This model describes the optimal choice behavior
in a hazard rate task, namely that one makes a choice based on a combination of the log
likelihood ratio of evidence for switch versus stay based on the evidence and the previous
belief regarding which target is correct weighted by belief about how likely a switch is to
have occurred (Subjective Hazard Rate). Specifically,
𝐿𝑛 = 𝜑(𝐿𝑛−1 , 𝐻 ) + 𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑛
Where Ln is the belief regarding which of the two targets is correct on the current trial (n),
with the sign indicating which of the two targets is believed to be correct and the magnitude
indicating the strength of this belief. LLRn is the belief about which target is correct solely
gleaned from the location of the cue on the current trial. Ψ is a function that dictates how
to utilize belief on the previous trial based on the understood hazard rate (H). Specifically:

𝜑(𝐿𝑛−1 , 𝐻) = 𝐿𝑛−1 + log[

1−𝐻
1−𝐻
+ exp (−𝐿𝑛−1 )] − log [
+ exp (𝐿𝑛−1 )]
𝐻
𝐻
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When H=0.5, the terms of Ψ become zero, and the only information pertinent to the current
trial is that originating from the cue.
We determined subjective hazard rate by finding the H rate that resulting in the
greatest match between model predicted choices and monkey choices. Specifically, as in
(Glaze et al., 2018), we minimized the function:

𝑒 = − ∑(1 − 𝑐𝑛 ) ∗ log(1 − Pr(𝑐̂𝑛 )) + (𝑐𝑛 ) ∗ log(Pr(𝑐̂𝑛 ))
𝑛

Where cn represents the subject’s choice (1 or 0) and Pr(𝑐̂𝑛 ) represents the model-based
probability of making a choice cn,, namely:

Pr(𝑐̂𝑛 ) = 𝜆 + (1 − 2𝜆)/(1 + exp (−

𝐿𝑛
))
𝑣1

The additional parameters of λ and v1 capture lapse rate and noise respectively. The found
subjective hazard rate therefore describes how likely the monkey believes a switch in
correct target to be at the beginning of a trial (assuming the monkey is using an
approximation of the normative model to make his ultimate selections).
The subjective hazard rate, bias, and lapse were all used to assess behavioral
performance over time. Sessions where a behavioral measure was more than three standard
deviations from the mean measure were excluded as outliers. A Wilcoxon sign rank test
was used to test whether the subjective hazard rate and bias were significantly different
than zero.
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Neural Analysis
Isolated units were included in analysis according to the number of trials during
each task in which the neuron was isolated. Depending on analysis, cells needed at least 80
trials of ODR and/or at least 100 trials per block of aODR hazard rate.
Several analyses were done to assess the tunning properties of the recorded cells.
The first was a general assessment of tuning during the ODR task. The task was divided
into four epochs: Visual (the 50ms the cue was on screen), Memory (the period between
the cue off and the fixation point off), Motor (the 500 ms after fixation point off), and
Reward (500-1000 ms after fixation off; note, a reward was not always given in the reward
period, depending on monkey choice) (Fig 3.1a). For each trial of given cue direction, the
firing rate was calculated during each of these epochs. A von Mises function was then fit
to this data in order to determine preferred direction and tuning properties. To assess
whether the tuning was significant, an ANOVA of firing rate as a function of cue direction
was performed as in Shintaro Funahashi et al., 1989. Additionally, an index of
directionality was determined by taking the difference of the maximum and minimum von
Mises fit activity divided by the sum of the max and minimum activity as in Sawaguchi &
Yamane, 1999.
Next, we wished to determine whether or not tuning properties of neurons were
altered by the context of the aODR. To do so, we divided trials by hazard rate and by which
target was correct for that trial. In the neutral hazard rate, there is no correlation between
which target is correct on the current trial and the previous one, while in the low hazard
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rate, there is a high probability that whatever target is correct on a given trial has been
correct for several trials. We also subdivided by trial epoch as above and focused on the
activity during the memory epoch. For each of these groups, we performed a linear
regression of firing rate as a function of cue location. We also bootstrap resampled the trials
to get a range of estimates of these parameters. Because there is no history dependence in
the neutral hazard rate, it was expected that there would be no difference in relationship
between firing rate and cue location based on which target was correct. Conversely, we
wanted to investigate whether there was a difference in the relationship of firing rate and
cue location according to correct target during the low hazard rate, when the correct target
was likely to have been correct on the previous trials. In order to determine whether there
was a difference, we performed a Wilcoxon sign rank test on the parameter (slope and
intercept) estimate distributions found through our bootstrapping between trials with each
target correct for both the neutral and low hazard rate trials.
As a more general assessment of whether the dlPFC cells thought to represent
working-memory decision stimuli differentially represented identical cues based on
context, we also compared the difference in the average activity of cells to the centermost
cue when different targets were correct in the neutral hazard rate verus low hazard rate.
Because the center cue contains no information about which target is correct in the neutral
hazard rate, all trials were considered regardless of whether the monkey happened to select
correctly. One would additionally expect there to be little difference in the activity between
trials when the two targets were correct because there was no way for the monkey or cells
to know the correct target in advance. Conversely, we utilized only correct trials in the low
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hazard rate condition. This differential criterion was utilized based on the thought that if
there were a difference in mental representation potentially responsible for appropriate
differential interpretation of identical cues, it would be most prevalent when the appropriate
interpretation was employed and the monkey selected the correct target. For each cell we
obtained the difference in activity based on the correct target for the low and neutral hazard
rates and found whether this difference was statistically significant via a Wilcoxon rank
sum test.
As a final investigation, we probed the differences in neuron response to similar
stimuli between the ODR and aODR tasks. Specifically, we used a t-test to compare the
average response of the neurons to the cues closest to the targets in the neutral hazard rate
context and the responses to the ODR cues at 45° above and below the horizontal on the
same side as the aODR cues. The aODR cues were 9° closer to the horizontal than the ODR
cues, but correct responses were made to the same location. We wanted to know whether
the similar location and responses engendered similar neural activity, particularly if the
neuron had demonstrated tuning preference. Similarly, we compared average activity
between neutral hazard rate aODR trials with the neutral (center) cue and the activity to the
ODR cue of the same location. In this instance, the stimuli were identically placed but the
responses were different, namely in the aODR task the monkey had to respond 45° above
or below the horizontal whereas in the ODR task the response was to the cue location itself.

118

Results
Behavior
Our monkeys were trained on an adaptive Oculomotor Delayed Response task
(aODR) in which they were presented a cue whose proximity to a choice target was
indicative of the probability that that target would be rewarded. The trials were presented
in blocks in which the correct target was either chosen at random (50% switch; neutral
hazard rate) or had a low probability of switching from whatever target had been correct
on the previous trial (5% switch; low hazard rate). Ideally, monkeys choose the correct
target extremely frequently when the cue is close to a target due to the strong evidence.
When the cue is located in an ambiguous position between the targets, the monkey ideally
will be biased in the low hazard rate condition to select whichever target was correct on
the previous trial. In order to assess the monkey’s performance, the proportion of trials in
which the monkey switched targets from what was previously correct (P(Switch)) was
plotted as a function of the cue-based evidence for a switch (log likelihood ratio for change;
LLR) as seen in Fig. 3.2a,b. The choices were fit to a logistic function in order to assess
performance. The lapse rate parameter (Fig. 3.2a) measures how often the monkey
switched when the evidence was strong that the correct target had not changed. For monkey
Ci, the average lapse rate over the sessions was 17.44% (Fig. 3.2c), whereas for monkey
MM the average lapse rate was 3.13% (Fig. 3.2d); as such, monkey MM had a better grasp
of what the cues meant with respect to the target reward. The bias parameter measures what
level of evidence corresponded to the monkey switching half of the time (Fig 3.2b). Ideally,
the bias for the low hazard rate should be higher than the bias for the neutral hazard rate
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because it should take more evidence to make a switch choice. As such, the difference in
bias between low and neutral hazard rates should be positive if the monkey understands
the hazard rate context. Monkey Ci had an average bias difference between low and neutral
hazard rate conditions of 0.0982 (Fig. 3.2e) and was not significantly different from zero
(Wilcoxon sign rank test that median=0; p=.07), whereas monkey MM had an average bias
difference of 0.516 that was significantly positive (p<.001; Fig. 3.2f). Therefore, the
behavior of MM showed some difference as a consequence of hazard rate while Ci did not
show a difference in behavior.
Additionally, monkey behavior was fit to the normative model of adaptive behavior
in unstable environments (Glaze et al., 2015). The fitting determined what subjective
hazard rate would best explain the monkey’s choices. If the monkey understands the hazard
rate context, then the subjective hazard rate during the objective low hazard rate blocks
should be lower than the subjective hazard rate during the neutral hazard rate blocks. For
monkey Ci, the average difference in subjective hazard rate was 3.7% (Fig. 3.2g). Monkey
MM had an average hazard rate difference of 12.1% (Fig. 3.2h). Both these values were
significantly different from zero (Wilcoxon sign-rank test, Ci: p=0.023; MM: p<.001). As
such, monkey Ci showed very weakly adaptive behavior across hazard rate conditions,
whereas monkey MM showed some evidence of adaptive behavior during the preliminary
stages of this project.
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Figure 3.2: Behavioral analyses. Left column: data from monkey Ci. Right column:
data from monkey MM. a,b) sample sessions of behavior (probability of switch) as a
function of cue-based evidence for a switch. a) visual demonstration of lapse rate, b)
visual representation of bias. Errorbars represent +/- SEM. c,d) lapse rate across
multiple sessions. e,f) Difference in bias based on hazard rate block (e.g. difference
between dotted colored lines in b) across sessions. Positive bias differences indicate
understanding of the importance of hazard rate in making optimal choices. g,h)
Difference in fit subjective hazard rate across sessions. Subjective hazard rate
represents the model-based estimate of what hazard rate best explains the monkey’s
choice behavior. Positive difference values indicate an understanding of the difference
in hazard rates between blocks.
Figure 3.2: Behavioral analyses
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Population Tuning Properties
In order to address the question of whether adaptive behavior was related to a
change in tuning properties of memory-related dlPFC cells, we first assessed the tuning
properties of the recorded cells during an oculomotor delayed response task (ODR; Fig.
3.1a, top). To do so, we plotted firing rate as a function of cue location for 8 different
memory cues spaced 45° apart for each of the different epochs of the task (visual, memory,
motor, reward). We then determined whether the cell was sensitive to cue location by
comparing the firing rates using an ANOVA (Fig. 3.3 a-d). A p-value of <0.05 indicated
that the cell reliably fired more to at least one direction compared to another. We also
assessed tuning by fitting a von Mises function to the firing rate data as a function of cue
location to determine a preferred direction. The degree of this tuning was measured by a
directionality index (max rate - min rate)/(max rate + min rate). Across the population of
87 recorded cells (75 from Ci, 12 from MM), 5 cells had a significant effect of cue location
on firing rate during the visual period, 10 during the memory period, 18 during the motor
period, and 16 during the reward period. An example of a cell that was deemed selective
to 135° during the memory and motor period is shown in Fig. 3.3a-d. We also plotted the
population directionality index results across the visual, memory, and motor epochs
marked by whether the difference of activity was significant (Fig. 3.3e,f). Many cells have
a high index, theoretically indicating some directionality preference. However, the lack of
significance in the ANOVA for most cells suggests that the difference in activity to
different cues as measured by the index was not reliable across multiple trials and is likely
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driven by one or two trials with unusually high or low firing rates rather than consistent
differences.
While we did find some cells that displayed some degree of tuning during each
epoch, we were most interested in analyzing cells with significant directionality during the
memory period. Only 11.5% of recorded cells met this criterion, and as such, further
conclusions about the whether the tuning properties of memory selective cells was related

Figure 3.3: Tuning of neural activity during the ODR task. a-d) example
activity of a cell during each epoch of the ODR separated by cue locations. This
cell had significant tuning to 135° during the memory and motor epochs (p
<0.05 for ANOVA significant effect of cue location on firing rate). Blue lines
represent mean firing rate, error bars SEM, and red lines are the von Mises fit.
e) tuning index across the visual and memory epochs, colored by significance. f)
same as e but for the memory and motor epochs. Majority of cells were not
significantly
tunedduring
despite
Figure
3.3: Tuning(reliably)
of neural activity
the decently
ODR task high indices. Cells that were
significantly tuned tended to only be so during one epoch.
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to adaptive behavior was not possible with the current data set. However, a method to
assess such effects was developed and tested using the current data. Further data collection
on this project is ongoing, and possible reasons for the lack of directionality are examined
in the discussion section.
Effect of context on firing rate dependance on cue location
If memory encoding cells are relevant to interpreting sensory evidence toward a
decision, then when the context dictates that a given sensory cue has a different meaning,
some neural activity should reflect this difference. As such, we examined the response of
the neurons during the neutral hazard rate context compared to the low hazard rate context.
Specifically, during the neutral hazard rate, regardless of which target is correct, a given
cue’s implications for which target is correct remains constant. Therefore, the activity of
the cell representing this evidence should also be consistent regardless of which target is
correct. Conversely, during the low hazard rate, the meaning of the evidence with regards
to which target is correct depends upon which target has been correct (as it is likely to
remain correct). If these memory encoding cells also encode altered cue meaning, then
their activity should also differ to the same cue when different targets are correct.
In order to investigate whether this pattern is present, a linear regression was
performed to characterize firing rate during the memory period as a function of cue location
separately for each correct target at each hazard rate (example in Fig 3.4a). The fitting gave
two parameters describing the relationship between cue and firing rate: the slope and the
intercept. Within a hazard rate, these parameters were compared (Wilcoxon sign rank test
that bootstrap distributions of parameter estimates between conditions had median
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significantly different from zero). Across the population, many of the cells (79/87) had
different relationships between cue location and firing rate (both slope and intercept) in the
low hazard rate depending on which target was currently active. However, many of these
cells, (71/87 for slope and 74/87 for intercept) also had significantly different parameters
describing the relationship between firing rate and cue location for the neutral hazard rate,
when there should have been no difference (Fig. 3.4b,c). Across the population we found
no significant difference in the parameter differences based on which target was correct in
neutral versus low hazard rates across the population (Wilcoxon sign rank text: intercept:
p=0.22, slope: p=0.84).

Figure 3.4: Assessment of relationship between cue location and firing rate for
different conditions of correct target and hazard rate. a) Example of a cell where the
effect of cue location on firing rate differed when target 1 (T1) was correct was
compared to when target 2 (T2) was correct during the low hazard rate but not for
the neutral hazard rate (slope significantly different). H=hazard rate, lines are the
best fit (firing rate=cue*slope + intercept). b) population differences in intercept
when different targets were correct for low hazard rate compared to neutral hazard
rate. c) same as b but for slope parameter. Blue dots represent cells consistent with
the hypothesis that neural activity reflects change in informational content.
Figure 3.4: Assessment of relationship between cue location and firing rate for different conditions of
correct target and hazard rate
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This difference in relationship between firing rate and cue location across all
conditions implies that there was not a stable effect of cue location on the firing of these
cells, which is consistent with the general lack of significant effect of cue location during
the ODR task.
As a second investigation of whether a difference in cue implications affected
neural response to the cue, we investigated the average firing rate of the neurons to the
central cue location during the memory period. This location represents the largest change
in informational content by context, with the cue containing no information about the
correct target during the neutral hazard rate condition but providing strong evidence that
the correct target is the same as on the previous trial in the low hazard rate condition. We
looked at whether the difference in activity when target 1 was correct compared to when
target 2 was correct was significant and whether it differed between hazard rates. If the
neuron reflects informational content of the cue, then the difference in activity in the neutral
hazard rate should be insignificant (as the cue provides no information regarding which
target is correct) whereas there should be a difference in the low hazard rate. Figure 3.5
shows the differences of activity based on correct target between the low and neutral hazard
rates for each cell. For cells recorded during both blocks for sufficient number of trials, in
49 cells, the response to the central cue was not significantly different (Wilcoxon rank sum
test) between trials with either target correct for both the low and neutral hazard rate blocks.
Surprisingly, 15 cells had a significant difference in response based on correct target only
the neutral hazard, whereas 8 cells had a significant difference in response based on correct
target only in the low hazard rate. We found 2 cells with significant differences in response
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based on correct target in both blocks. Only one of the cells with a significant difference in
activity during the low hazard rate block but not the neutral block was also directionally
selective.

Figure 3.5: Difference in activity to central cue during different correct targets across
blocks. Color indicates result of test of whether activity was significantly different
(Wilcoxon rank sum, p<0.05) during a given block. Many cells had similar differences
in activity across blocks (fall along identity line). Some cells had greater activity
differences in the low compared to neutral hazard rate blocks (point below identity
line), but the difference in activity was often not significant.
Figure 3.5: Difference in activity to central cue during different correct targets across blocks

Effect of task on responses to similar stimuli
We also examined whether neural activity was consistent between task when the
presented cue was similar. During the ODR (Guided Saccade) task, cues could be located
45° above and below the horizontal and at the horizontal itself. The aODR had cues located
at 36° above and below the horizontal as well as at the horizontal itself. During the neutral
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hazard rate, when there is no relevant history to alter cue interpretations, if cells are
representing the location of the cue, then responses should be similar to similar cue
locations regardless of task. We compared activity between these three cue locations (two
closest to the target 1 (T1) and target 2 (T2), and the central cue (Neutral;N)) in the two
tasks (Fig 3.6). We found ~ 2/3 of the cells with data from both tasks had indistinguishable
activity levels (t-test for mean difference = 0) to the three cues regardless of task. The
median difference in activity for similar cues between the two tasks across the population
was significantly different from zero for the center and T2 cues (N: p=0.049, T2: p=0.023)
but not for T1 cues (p=0.38). Overall, some cells had similar activity to a given cue location
regardless of task, while others did not.

Figure 3.6: Comparison of neural activity to similar cues in different tasks. a) cue
location 45° above horizontal for Guided Saccades (ODR) or 36° above horizontal
(aODR), closest to target T1. b) cue in the horizontal position (N: Neutral or central
cue in aODR). c) same as a but below the horizontal closest to target T2. Blue dots
represent cells with a significantly different firing rate in the two conditions (t-test of
mean difference equal to zero).
Figure 3.6: Comparison of neural activity to similar cues in different tasks
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Discussion
This study aims to investigate the relationship between tuning properties and
activity of dlPFC cells and adaptive behavior in an oculomotor delayed response (aODR)
task requiring integration of context and evidence. dlPFC cells are thought to encode
memory representations of spatial stimuli (Compte, 2000; Shintaro Funahashi, 2015;
Shintaro Funahashi et al., 1989; Takeda & Funahashi, 2002) with individual cells having a
preferred direction. Under such models, activity of a cell can be considered a proxy for
how much the preferred direction is being held in working memory compared to alternative
directions. Within the aODR task, monkeys viewed a briefly presented cue whose
proximity to a target was indicative of the probability that that target would be rewarded.
We wished to investigate whether the activity of tuned dlPFC cells shifted as the monkey
decided which target to select based on cue evidence (as in S. Funahashi, 2006; Takeda &
Funahashi, 2002), and whether such shift depended upon context. In the neutral hazard rate
context, proximity was the only information the monkey could use to logically decide.
However, in the low hazard rate condition, the previously correct target was likely to
remain correct. Thus, the implications of a given cue as to which target was correct
depended upon the context. We wished to investigate if the dlPFC responses to a given cue
differed with these different implications.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to make cohesive conclusions regarding the central
question at this point in time. Only one monkey (MM) showed reliably adaptive behavior
both in terms of having a bias towards not switching in the low hazard rate and having a
lower subjective hazard rate in the low hazard rate block under the normative model. This
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pattern of behavior has gotten stronger in the time since the last session fully analyzed at
the time of writing. Ci did not show consistent shifts in either bias or subjective hazard
rate. While there were a few sessions in which Ci had a positive bias difference and/or
subjective hazard rate difference, these usually corresponded to behavior that was not well
fit by the models. As such, it is difficult to justify any conclusions regarding the neural
correlates of adaptive behavior given that 75/87 cells were recorded from Ci. Even had Ci
shown adaptive behavior, only 11.5% of cells thus far recorded had a hint of the tuning
behavior we wished to investigate. Therefore, while other questions might be asked about
the data set in its current state, in order to address the original question data collection must
continue.
It is not necessarily surprising that only one of our monkeys showed adaptive
behavior. In the original study of adaptive behavior, Glaze et al., 2015 focused on the
optimal approach to decisions making in unstable contexts and how human behavior
approximated this model. However, a follow up study (Glaze et al., 2018) that further
analyzed the data found that of 41 subjects, approximately a third of them showed little to
no adaptivity to different hazard rates. Admittedly, in the original study the block changes
were not signaled, unlike in the current study. However, Glaze et al., 2018 did find that
over multiple sessions the adaptivity and baseline behavior of subjects remained quite
stable, suggesting that behavior in unstable environments might be inherent to the subject.
Glaze et al., 2018 also found that non-adaptive subjects had very steep psychometric
functions, consistent with Ci’s behavior (Fig. 3.2a) whereas adaptive subjects had
shallower psychometric functions consistent with MM’s behavior (Fig. 3.2b). Given that
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we seem to have two monkeys that exhibit different adaptivity in this unstable environment
task, it may be possible in the future to perform comparisons between activity changes in
the two monkeys to suggest what neural behavior is concurrent with adaptive behavior and
absent in non-adaptive behavior. Ideally though, any such findings would be demonstrated
in multiple subjects to support the generality of such comparisons.
Additionally, we explicitly sought to investigate the activity of dlPFC cells with
tuned memory behavior. We targeted these cells because these cells are thought to
represent decision-relevant spatial information (S. Funahashi, 2006; Shintaro Funahashi,
2015; Patricia S. Goldman-Rakic, 1987) and they are sensitive to NE (A. F.T. Arnsten et
al., 1988; Amy F.T. Arnsten, 2000; Mao et al., 1999) which is thought to be important for
decision making in unstable environments (Krishnamurthy et al., 2017; Nassar et al., 2012).
However, we only found 11.5% of recorded cells had significantly different activity to at
least one direction during the memory epoch the ODR task. This contrasts with the reported
30% of more classic studies (Shintaro Funahashi et al., 1989). It is therefore plausible that
we were not able to reliably access the dlPFC given the placement of the chamber for a
previous study. Moving forward, there are plans to move the chamber more directly over
the dlPFC in hopes of more reliably finding neurons with the desired properties.
Though neither the behavior nor the cellular properties were ideal for investigating
whether changes in neural tuning properties correspond to adaptive behavior, we did
develop a method to test this question. We performed a linear regression to determine firing
rate as a function of cue location during the aODR task for trials with each target correct
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and at each hazard rate. Theoretically, the parameters would be indistinguishable between
each target condition in the neutral hazard rate (because the cue implications are constant)
and the similarity of the parameters for the low hazard rate would answer the posed
question. However, for the cells we recorded the majority of had significantly different
parameters in the neutral hazard rate condition. This finding may imply that these cells had
a response that was too variable to be reliably captured by the linear fit. However, the
findings of similar activity for many cells to the central cue (Fig. 3.5) and to similar cues
between contexts (Fig. 3.6) suggests this may not be the case. An alternative explanation
is that there is unequal sampling of responses to different cue locations. When T1 is correct
there are necessarily more trials with cues near T1 and vice versa for T2. As such, when
doing the linear fits there is an oversampling near the extremes of the line, which can result
in over weighting of these points. Future attempts may wish to subsample equal numbers
of point from each cue location when fitting, although doing so will require running the
experiment for longer in order to gather enough trials given current distributions of cues.
Given that we were unable to address the original question, we did investigate the
response of the cells to similar cues under the different task conditions. Many cells did
have similar responses to similar cues (Fig. 3.6). However, a significant subset did not for
both cues close to T2 and those near the neutral condition. There are several possible
explanations for such differences. The primary explanation is that the visual features (size
and color) were not identical in the two conditions. Future investigations could reduce these
differences to isolate this factor more explicitly. Another possible explanation is that the
isolation of the neuron changed between the two tasks, as the ODR was always performed
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before the aODR. A second block of ODR could be performed at the end of the session so
as to isolate this factor; if difference in activity were found between the first and second
ODR blocks then conclusions about differences between the aODR and ODR would not
be firm. A more interesting explanation for the difference in activity is that in the ODR
responses are to the cue locations, whereas in the aODR responses to the central cue
required movement to the distant targets. Differences based on this explanation would
imply that this area has activity dependent on the motor implication of the cue.
Alternatively, for the cues located near T1 and T2, the cues in the aODR were not
identically placed to those from the ODR. As such, differences in neural response could
potentially be due to high sensitivity to locations in these cells. Overall, the possible
differences in activity have a number of possible origins which require future investigations
to untangle.
In summary, we were unable to draw firm conclusions regarding the relationship
between neural activity and adaptive behavior. We did develop methods to investigate this
question and determined many factors which may be impeding deductions. Several future
directions are planned to address these factors and as such, the project is ongoing.
Investigating the question of how the brain interprets identical evidence with different
context-based implications may lead to better treatments for certain disorders. For example,
ex-soldier PTSD patients often respond to loud noises as if they are being attacked, despite
the fact that it is more likely the noise is a truck going by. Through better understanding of
how the brain shifts its interpretation of such sensory cues, we may be able to better address
when this process fails.
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS, CONSIDERATIONS AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS
Summary
Working memory and decision-making have been extensively studied
independently but rarely in conjunction. This dissertation sought to address this gap by
investigating the role of working memory in implementing several computational aspects
of decision making. In particularly, Chapter 2 detailed the experiments performed to
determine how an abstracted quantity (decision variable) interacted with working memory.
We report the novel finding that abstracted, continuous values become more variable the
longer they are held in working memory. Furthermore, the degree of degradation depends
on which strategy participants use to hold information in mind. Interestingly, different
participant behavior was consistent with two different strategies, suggesting extensive
flexibility in how decisions information is stored. Chapter 3 conversely hypothesized how
prior information might mechanistically be integrated into the interpretation of current
evidence. Though the experiments were unable to rigorously test these hypotheses, work
on the project is ongoing.
Limitation and Considerations
While these findings extend our current knowledge of the interactions between
decision making and working memory, there are still several limitations that need to be
considered. Notably, while the human work is based on a framework of bump attractor
working memory based on physiological findings (Compte, 2000; Funahashi et al., 1989;
Wei et al., 2012), it is only one possible, partial explanation of working memory. Other
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research suggests that the persistent activity that is the basis of the bump attractor models
is not as important for the storage of memoranda as the oscillations and synchrony
measured in local field potentials (Arski et al., 2021; Lundqvist et al., 2016; Miller et al.,
2018; Pina et al., 2018; Roux & Uhlhaas, 2014). While these alternative models have less
of a concrete explanation of how a specific item is encoded, they do a good job of predicting
working memory behavior and address the problem of feature binding (e.g. color and
location in our working memory task) in a way not as detailed in many bump attractor
models (Pina et al., 2018). Some work has been done on uniting these camps (Barbosa,
Babushkin, et al., 2021), but a conclusive mechanism is far from agreed upon.
Additionally, several factors known to be a part of the working memory process
were not considered in this preliminary foray into the interaction of working memory and
decision making. For example, memory of multiple items are known to interact, such that
the diffusion of any given memoranda is not independent of the others (Almeida et al.,
2015; Krishnan et al., 2018). Such interaction would alter the diffusion assumed in the
Diffuse-then-Average model and thus the predictions that were compared to the data;
however, the implications were not readily apparent, so the approximation of independence
was utilized. Additionally, our model was based exclusively on the mathematics of
diffusive processes; the actual implementation of such activity would also require
metabolic costs, which might need to be considered to fully understand the workingmemory representations of decision variables.
Given how many models and variations there are for working memory, it is not
especially surprising that the models used to fit the data in Chapter 2, while theoretically
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mutually exclusive at the average parameters found by our participants, both did a fairly
good job at explaining behavior. However, at a minimum the experimental data provides
more constraints which future, more complete models can use to capture the underlying
cognitive phenomenon more accurately.
While incomplete, the study detailed in Chapter 3 aims to address the important
question of how prior information is incorporated into a decision. Behaviorally, the use of
priors in perceptual decision making has been demonstrated in many contexts (light,
orientation, speed, stability) where priors inform use of sensory input into a motor action
(Glaze et al., 2015; Gold & Stocker, 2017; Krishnamurthy et al., 2017). However, at what
stage of processing the prior is incorporated remains unclear. Particularly with the case of
environmental instability, modeling has suggested that the likelihood of change dictates
the rate of leak in evidence accumulation, for example in a random dot motion task
requiring the discrimination of dot motion (e.g. Glaze et al., 2015). However, it is unclear
whether this variable leak is implemented at the stage of sensory accumulation (e.g. likely
by the LIP) or at the level of sensory encoding (e.g. by MT; Shadlen & Newsome, 2001).
It is entirely plausible that the variable rate of environmental change gates the flow of
sensory evidence from MT to LIP or that MT adapts quickly to stimuli in unstable
environments to transmit less evidence upstream in cases where evidence rapidly becomes
irrelevant. Investigation of this possible implantation of the prior in sensory evidence is
ongoing in the lab.
Similarly, Chapter 3 sought to investigate how priors of stability might be
incorporated into choices of adaptive decision making with regards to spatial cues. The
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hypothesis that the study was designed to investigate was whether population-based bumplike neural activity representing spatial locations in working memory were pulled towards
the more likely target in the case of high stability. Such dynamics are consistent with
behavior in a color memory task, where reports drift towards more commonly presented
colors (Panichello et al., 2019). Additionally, the tuning properties of neural activity have
already been shown to be able to explain random diffusion in memory responses in
monkeys (Wimmer et al., 2014). Therefore, it seems reasonable that the prior of stability
manifests in a propensity for the activity of the population to develop directional drift
consistent with the current state.
However, there is an alternative hypothesis of how a prior might be represented in
working memory that was not deeply explored. All work in this dissertation assumes that
working memory information is stored in a bump of activity across several neurons tuned
to specific directions. The current hypothesis suggests that the prior is implemented in the
directional drift of the bump. However, the width of this bump may also be relevant to the
implantation of priors into perceptual decision making. When a prior is weak (e.g. right
after a change in environment), it can be thought of as a broad probability distribution
(Krishnamurthy et al., 2017). As more evidence is incorporated, the prior narrows and
becomes more influential on decisions. Hypothetically, the prior itself could be encoded as
a bump in working memory with variable width corresponding to the reliability of the prior.
The width of the bump has been hypothesized to be important to stability (diffusion) of the
bump over delays and the optimal width is thought to differ with different set sizes to
balance diffusion and interaction dynamics (Krishnan et al., 2018). If the width of the bump
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can be modified to serve the storage of multiple items, it is conceivable it may also be
leveraged to represent variable prior widths. Storing a prior in the location of a neural
activity bump and its reliability in the width of said bump would allow the dynamics of a
prior seen in behavior of previous studies with continuous decisions (Krishnan et al., 2018).
However, in order to observe such a phenomenon it would be necessary to observe neurons
with multiple preferred angles sampling the full extent of the hypothesized bump, which is
difficult to ensure with current techniques.
In Chapter 3 where there are only two possible choices, such a continuous prior is
likely not necessary to account for the behavior. The aODR task used in Chapter 3 also has
somewhat of a confound between a prior of which target is correct (which is uniform in the
neutral hazard rate and switches infrequently between the two targets in the low hazard rate
context) and a prior of the stability of the environment (stability prior). The prior of stability
is a hierarchical feature that may be difficult to grasp for some subjects, such as monkey
Ci, and might be simplified by signaled blocks of asymmetric probability of the correct
target. As such, future work may wish to try to disentangle these two expectations when
examining the neural mechanisms behind prior encoding.
Alternative working-memory model and implications
The work presented in this dissertation primarily considered the hypothesis of
memoranda being held in working memory through the persistent activity of specifically
tuned neurons. The models of how such persistent activity might be maintained and
change over time guided the predictions used to analyze the present results. However,
there is an alternative and not mutually exclusive model that also bears consideration
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when analyzing working-memory dependent cognitive tasks. This alternative model is
termed the “activity-silent hypothesis” or “synaptic model” of working-memory (LewisPeacock et al., 2012; Mongillo et al., 2008; Stokes, 2015). The model states that rather
than being actively maintained by the persistent activity of tuned neurons, memoranda
are stored by an altering of the synaptic connections (weights) between neurons.
Specifically, encoding of a memorandum involves altering the weights of associated
neurons, such that when the neural network is re-activated by a probe, the stimulusrepresenting neurons are more readily activated than neurons tuned to irrelevant stimuli.
Energetically, the activity-silent hypothesis is more efficient, as it does not require the
active maintenance of the memoranda through costly spiking (Stokes, 2015).
Instead, the activity-silent model suggests that the memory ‘buffer’ is held
through intrinsic properties of the neurons representing the memoranda. One such
possible mechanism is through calcium dynamics (Mongillo et al., 2008). The stimulus
activates the representing neuron and causes an influx of calcium; even after the cessation
of stimulation, residual calcium remains due to the long time constant of calcium kinetics
for ~1-2 seconds. This residual calcium at memory-relevant synapses would make
spiking more likely/frequent when probed by a cue to make a response, thus reactivating
the relevant memory. Additionally, such calcium could theoretically be involved in
altering intrinsic membrane properties of the memory-representing neurons such that
these neurons become more excitable (depolarized) relative to neurons tuned to irrelevant
stimuli. Such alterations could be achieved through a calcium-activated non-specific
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cation channel such as those known to cause plateau potentials in the rat substantia nigra
(Lee & Tepper, 2007).
Additionally, there is substantial evidence that such short-term changes in
synaptic weights may contribute to performace of short-term memory tasks. For example,
some electrophysiology experiments in which monkeys performed working memory
tasks found variable, weak, or absent of persistent activity (for review see: Masse et al.,
2020). One such study combined an attention task with a memory task (Watanabe &
Funahashi, 2014). Monkeys were presented with an attention target, followed by a
memory target and a delay. During the delay, the attention target would change color,
indicating that the monkey had to release a lever. After a further delay, the monkey
would be cued to indicate which of several options was the memory target. While waiting
for the attention target to change color, robust persistent activity for the memory target
(as measured by the ability to decode the memory target from the neural activity) was
absent. However, after the end of the attention response, discrimination accuracy for the
memory target increased. This finding suggests that the memory was encoded in such a
way that it could be ‘re-activated’ once the attention demands had been addressed but
was not actively held through persistent activity.
Human studies have also suggested an activity-silent role of working memory,
finding that memoranda can only be decoded from fMRI activity when the items are
immediately relevant (and not if some other intervening task is being performed) (Emrich
et al., 2013; Lewis-Peacock et al., 2012). Furthermore, one study found that by presenting
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a visual cue (‘pinging’ the neural network) during the delay period in which the
memoranda is not attended and delay activity is not seen, there was a decodable
difference in electroencephalogram response to the visual based on the identity of the
memory cue (Wolff et al., 2017). In other words, the identity of the memorandum was
not decodable during the delay period because of the absence of persistent activity, but
was decodable when the network was activated with a cue because there were different
responses caused by the hidden states associated with each possible memorandum.
Additionally, a study employing recurrent neural networks trained to perform delayed
match-to-sample tasks found that short-term synaptic plasticity was able to support shortterm memory maintenance (Masse et al., 2019, 2020). However, these networks were not
able to perform tasks involving the manipulation of information in working memory
without the use of persistent activity. As such, it is very likely that some combination of
activity-silent and persistent activity mechanisms are responsible for implementation of
working-memory tasks (Barbosa et al., 2020; Barbosa, Lozano-Soldevilla, et al., 2021).
Whether or not activity-silent mechanism are responsible for representing
memoranda, the implications for the current work remain relatively unchanged.
Specifically, with regards to the Average-then-Diffuse hypothesis, the single item of the
mean could still be encoded whether through persistent activity or through the facilitation
of synapses. While the former hypothesis readily predicts diffusion of this single item, the
later can also explain a decrease in precision as well. Under the activity-silent hypothesis,
the synaptic changes responsible for encoding the single item would decay over the course
of the delay. As such, the later a response is requested, the less likely the precise
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memorandum-representing neurons would be reactivated, resulting in the more variable
responses seen in this study. Likewise, under the Diffuse-then-Average hypothesis, the
individual items could be encoded in changes to synaptic weights but encoding precision
would still be expected to be affected by the increased load compared to a single item. The
decay of the synaptic changes would still result in increasingly variable final
representations after increasing delays. Conceivably, an activity-silent scheme of encoding
would be less susceptible to inter-item interference (attraction/repulsion) and might
therefore be a better implementation of the assumptions applied in the current work.
However, the implications of re-activation of the activity-silent encoding by the
presentation of the Late cue in the Sequential conditions, similar to the ‘pinging’ of Wolff
et al., 2017s might lead to slightly different predictions of variance changes than those of
the particle-diffusion simplification of the full persistent activity hypothesis. Overall, exact
understanding of the implications of the activity-silent hypothesis (possibly in combination
with the persistent activity hypothesis) to the encoding of computational elements of
decision making awaits future work creating a more detailed modeling of the exact activity
and connections between simulated neurons.
Alternative systems for future research
Both studies presented in this dissertation rely on models to make hypotheses about
how the brain encodes various elements of decisions. However, no matter how complex a
model, without biological evidence it is only a possible explanation of what is really
occuring. The models in the human study relied on evidence found in monkey recordings.
Chapter 3 attempted to extend the biological data used to support such models of working-
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memory based decision making but succeed in illuminating several limitations of this kind
of recording. Many monkey studies rely on single unit recordings, where you essentially
drop in your line and wait for a neuron to bite; you cannot see what you’ve caught and have
little idea of what other neurons the cell is communicating with. All models of working
memory and decision making rely on an architecture of connectivity between similarly
tuned cells. While timing experiments suggest such a connection (Constantinidis et al.,
2001) and tracing experiments reveal nearby cells synapsing (Kritzer & Goldman-Rakic,
1995) the full interaction of the hypothesized network has yet to be observed in mammals.
Recording arrays do somewhat of a better job of capturing the activity of all relevant cells,
but the nature of the connections still cannot be well observed in a mammalian brain.
As such, to better constrain the details of bump attractor models of working
memory, smaller, more controllable model systems might be better suited. For example,
the same sort of bump attractor hypothesized to represent working memory for spatial
locations in primates has been demonstrated in drosophila navigation (Kim et al., 2017).
This directly observable network has been shown to be able to do angle integration in the
conversion of heading direction to allocentric traveling direction (Green & Maimon, 2018;
Lyu et al., 2022) in a way that may be relevant for the sort of prior integration that we
attempted to study in Chapter 3. Drosophila have the distinct advantage over mammalian
systems that the entire brain can be imaged using two-photon calcium imaging.
Additionally, there is a wide range of tools for genetically manipulating the circuit to better
dissect its workings. Such causal experiments are essential in understanding how the brain
is actually performing the computations theorized by modeling.
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This system does have the disadvantage that the network seems to sustain only a
single bump (as there can only be one heading direction at a time), whereas working
memory seems to have more complex interactions that allow the storage of multiple items
(Wei et al., 2012). As such, a potential untapped model for the storage of multiple bumps
in an attractor network is the gastropod. Seashell patterning has been hypothesized to be
generated by the same sorts of local excitation and lateral inhibition networks thought to
sustain working memory (Boettiger et al., 2005) and seems to demonstrate the interaction
of multiple activity bumps depending on species. However, the experimental evidence for
the actual network is currently sparce. As such, a future direction that might allow better
understanding of the mammalian working memory system is investigation of the potential
networks generating the pigment patterns of seashells.
Implications of decision-making research
Howsoever it is investigated, understanding decision making is important to the
betterment of people’s qualities of life. Several disorders center on poor decision making
for one reason or another. On example is addiction. Addicts continuously choose actions
that lead to negative consequences despite having the information to know this outcome.
According to the National Institute for Drug Addiction, 40-60% of patients treated for
addiction currently experience relapses (How Effective Is Drug Addiction Treatment? |
National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA)). Understanding where the process of
transforming information about consequences into appropriate behavior is failing in these
individuals may eventually help them more effectively avoid relapse. Another example of
a disorder related to suboptimal decision making is PTSD. Studies have shown that PTSD
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sufferers have problems extinguishing learned associations (Milad et al., 2008, 2009). For
example, ex-soldiers who experience PTSD may react to innocuous stimuli such as a
helicopter with extreme distress. This response can be thought of as a failure to update their
priors of the meaning of this sound from a combat situation to safe environment. By better
understanding how such priors are learned and integrated in the interpretation of incoming
stimuli, better treatment might be achievable for such people.
Apart from medical disorders, decision making is a fundamental part of everyday
life. From knowing when to cross the street, to buying a car, to picking a college, we are
constantly making decision that dictate our future. By better understanding how these
decisions are made, we are understanding an essential part of the human experience.
Whether through modeling or biological mechanism, better understanding how we make
decisions can only improve the way we interact with the world around us.
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